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INTRODUCTION: THE RISK OF

LIE

DETECTOR EXAMINATIONS IN

CRIMINAL CASES

Lie detector examinations often produce material that can be
devastating in the hands of an opponent. This article is concerned
both with the production of this material and with the need for a
new evidentiary privilege to allow the continued'use of lie detectors in criminal investigation. Failure to recognize a new privilege
will deprive the criminal justice system of a valuable tool in the
resolution of criminal disputes. The widespread use of lie detection' makes the development of such a privilege essential.
An attorney usually orders the administration of a lie detector test because he hopes the result will be useful in litigation.
The prosecutor may wish to check the veracity of a witness; the
defense attorney may hope that if the defendant passes the examination, criminal charges will be dismissed. The evidentiary use
of the results may be stipulated. Other uses abound. While defendants frequently seek to admit favorable test results into evidence, a test, however, may harm a given case because of three
kinds of information produced: (1) failure of the examination, (2)
admission of lying in the course of the examination, and (3) admission of wrongful activity unrelated to the subject matter of the
examination. To the extent that this information cannot be concealed from the opponent, lie detectors will have limited usefulness.
While any combination of these kinds of information can
occur, the third is particularly troublesome because a lie detector
examination of a witness who is absolutely truthful concerning
the case being investigated may uncover prior activity that impeaches the subject's credibility as a witness or that exposes him
to criminal prosecution. The structure of the examination guar-2
antees the occurrence of these admissions with great frequency,
although in practice they are not disclosed by the operator to
anyone. The privilege proposed by this article focuses on the use
of such information.
1. See, e.g., Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices by Federal

Agencies Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,93d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1974); STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY
OF PRIVACY, POLYGRAPHS AND EMPLOYMENT 1 (Comm. Print 1974); J. LARSON, LYING AND ITS
DETECTION (1932); J. REID & F. INBAU, TRUTH AND DECEPTION, THE POLYGRAPH ("LIEDETECTOR") TECHNIQUE

(2d ed. 1977); Lykken, Psychology and the Lie DetectorIndustry,

PSYCH. 725 (1974); Axelrod, The Use of Lie Detectors by Criminal Defense
Attorneys, 3 NAT'L J. CRIM. DEF. 107 (1977); Note, The Polygraphas a DispositionalAid
to the Juvenile Court, 9 NEW ENG. L. REv. 311 (1974).

29 Am.

2. See notes 9-14 and accompanying text infra.
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Even if attorneys are willing to risk the production and disclosure of damaging admission, the subject may not. The frankness of the subject regarding these admissions is essential to the
accuracy of the results. The examination may include a promise
by the operator that these unrelated admissions will not be disclosed. If disclosure becomes frequent or well known, a credible
promise cannot be given and test results will therefore be less
accurate.
After a consideration of the structure of the lie detector examination, three doctrines that may offer protection against disclosure of information revealed in the examination are discussed:
the attorney-client privilege; the work-product doctrine; and the
fifth amendment bar against self-incrimination. Each of these
doctrines is applied to the three kinds of information. As these
doctrines do not adequately protect against disclosure, the question of a new privilege is posed; however, for any privilege to be
workable, it cannot contradict constitutionally mandated disclosure. Thus, in accordance with the defendant's right to a fair
trial, a determination of whether a prosecutor must disclose lie
detector information because it is favorable to the defendant
must be made. Finally, an evidentiary privilege for lie detectors
is proposed, and the prospect of its recognition by the courts is
considered in light of judicial treatment of other privileges.
II.

How LIE DETECTORS PRODUCE ADMISSIBLE MATERIAL THAT
IMPEACHES THE SUBJECT

The purpose of the lie detector examination is to determine
whether the subject is truthful about a given matter. The subject
of the examination can be any person, including witnesses and
defendants. The focus of the examination varies accordingly. For
example, the lie detector test of a defendant in a murder case will
be oriented to determining whether the defendant is truthful
when he claims that he did not shoot the victim. The test of an
alleged eyewitness will be different, for the focus might then be
whether the witness is truthful when he says that he saw the
victim on the day of the shooting. In any case, however, the test
is given prior to trial.
The accuracy of the examination depends upon the operator's knowledge that he is triggering a specific concern of the
subject with each different question that is asked. For the operator to possess that knowledge, more than a simple "yes" or "no"
response from the subject is necessary at some point in the examihttps://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss3/9
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nation. Consequently, the subject must, upon prompting, disclose information that is unrelated to the crime being investigated. This information may be an admission of some wrongdoing
unrelated to the crime. If the subject refuses to cooperate, the
examination cannot be conducted properly. The operator frequently promises that admissions made by the subject for this
purpose will not be disclosed.3 Unfortunately, the nature of the
admissions can be crucial in determining whether the operator
has come to the correct conclusion in the results of the examination. The present section discusses why confidentiality is maintained or broken for these different purposes of verification and
accuracy.
The following definitions will be used in this discussion. A lie
detector, also known as a "polygraph," is a machine that accurately measures the blood pressure and breathing rate4 of the subject of the examination and records these physiological responses
as a function of time. The examination consists of several phases.5
First, there is a waiting period, during which the subject waits in
the operator's office. Next, there is the pretest interview, in which
the operator and the subject discuss the purpose of the examination, its accuracy, and the questions which the operator will ultimately ask the subject when the machine is connected. During
the pretest interview, the actual wording of these questions is
discussed and the subject reads an exact copy of what questions
will be asked. After the pretest interview, the subject is connected
to the lie detector and the operator then asks the subject the
prearranged questions, which are answered "yes" or "no." Some
discussion with the subject then takes place and another series
of questions is asked. This second series of questions tests the
ability of the subject to conceal from the operator the identity of
several cards that the subject has previously chosen. After this
3. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 1, at 50, 366. The promise is made most forcefully
when the test is administered a second time, when physiological responses are otherwise
difficult to interpret. The idea of confidentiality is implicit in the test setting; while an
explicit promise is not always made in the early part of the examination, a practice of
disclosure would create a reputation for lie detector examinations that would require an
early explicit promise for the examination to continue. Since confidentiality generally has
been observed, such explicit promises may not always be requested.
4. Other variables such as electrical conductivity of the skin or muscular contraction
are sometimes measured as well.
5. For a comprehensive description of lie detector technique, see J. REI & F. INBAU,
supra note 1, at 1-85. The technique is analyzed in Axelrod, supra note 1, at 107-36. Reid's
technique is the most prominent and widely used in the country. See Use of Polygraphs
as "Lie Detectors" by the Fed. Gov't: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Gov't Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
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series, which is referred to as the "card test," and further discussion, the original list of questions is asked again. The questions
may be varied according to the discussion that has taken place
while the subject was disconnected. Depending on the operator's
opinion, these questions may be administered again over a period
of several days. The questions are always subject to amendment
according to the discussions between the operator and the subject.
In the course of the examination, the subject may admit to
activity that is unrelated to the crime in question, but which
may, nonetheless, be valuable as a means of impeaching the credibility of the subject. These "unrelated admissions" usually relate to other criminal activity. When the operator examines the
recorded physiological responses in the context of the questions
asked and the answers received, he can determine whether the
subject has been truthful in answering a specific question. This
conclusion is called the "result" of the lie detector examination.
The person who examines the physiological responses and comes
to the conclusion regarding the subject's truthfulness is called the
"examiner." Often, the operator and the examiner are the same
person.
A.

The RelationshipBetween the Operator'sQuestions and the
Subject's Physiological Responses

There is no physiological activity that uniquely accompanies
deception.' Thus, lie detection cannot be as direct and unequivocal as an X-ray inspection for a crack in an airline wing or a blood
test for the presence of a viral antigen. Instead, the lie detector
measures some of the physiological concomitants of anxiety. Anxiety can have many causes, only one of which is deception; more6. A certain unwillingness to explicitly admit this fact by proponents of the lie detector is understandable in light of the usefulness of mystique surrounding the lie detectors
to the success of the technique. Nonetheless, dependence on strict environmental controls,
J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 1, at 6, the indistinguishability of a "deception" response
from a stress response, J. LARSON, supra note 1, at 258, and the responsive nature of the
variables measured to nondeceptive activities confirm this assertion. Axelrod, supra note
1, at 124-30; Damaser, Shor & Orne, PhysiologicalEffects DuringHypnoticallyRequested
Emotions, 25 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 334 (1953); Simons &Lang, PsychophysicalJudgment:
Electro-Corticaland Heart Rate Correlates of Accuracy and Uncertainty, 4 BIOLOGICAL
PSYCH. 51 (1976); Thackray & Orne, A Comparisonof PhysiologicalIndices in the Detection of Deception, 4 PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGY 329 (1968). Reid and Inbau, however, specifically
disclaim such a simple explanation for their technique. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 1,
at 5.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss3/9
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over, deception is not always accompanied by anxiety. The goal
of the operator's technique is to structure the lie detector examination in such a way that he can infer deception from the presence of anxiety when a certain question is asked. Specifically, the
operator attempts to maximize the anxiety of those subjects who
are lying about the matter under investigation at a different time
than when he maximizes the anxiety of those subjects who are
truthful about the matter under investigation; the goal of the
examination is to have all subjects lie -aboutactivity which is not
under investigation, on the theory that those who are lying about
nothing else will be maximally concerned about this unrelated lie
while those lying about the matter under investigation will be
maximally concerned with lies about that crime.
The application of this approach presents two difficulties:
the actual measurement of anxiety and the ability to make an
accurate inference from the timing of the anxiety. There is no
doubt concerning the accuracy of the lie detector in measuring
blood pressure and breathing variations, but the operator may
also assess anxiety through the subject's unrecorded behavior,
such as body movements and "fidgeting. ' Inferences are difficult
for many. reasons, one of which is that anxiety, however measured, may be inadvertently created in the subject if the operator
adopts an accusatory manner. Thus, the lie detector may record
anxiety that stems not from the subject's deception, but rather
from the subject's reaction to the operator's behavior. Similarly,
the operator's behavior may be shaped by the subject's unrecorded behavior, and therefore recorded responses may fail to
explain the dynamics of the examination.7 To the extent that the
subject fails to be forthright about other causes of anxiety or
becomes anxious about the investigation for some reason other
than deception, the pairing of anxiety and deception is invalid.
Knowledge of the communication between operator and subject
is crucial to a proper assessment of the impact of these difficulties
on the accuracy of the result of a particular examination.
7. This reliance on behavior that is not mechanically measured constitutes a substantial overlap between lie detector technique and general interrogation technique, particularly since it is recognized that an accusatory orientation by the examiner can give rise to
physiological responses from a truthful subject that will be wrongly interpreted as deceptive. J. REID & F. INBAu, supra note 1, at 17. The examiner who "reads" the behavior of
the subject as indicative of deception may thus fulfill his own prophecy by inducing the
physiological concomitants of stress. See Lykken, supra note 1, at 730.
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If another operator, an opposing attorney, or the trier of fact
is to meaningfully determine the weight to be given the operator's
conclusions, the communication between operator and subject
cannot be kept confidential. In other words, one cannot check the
operator's interpretation of physiological responses without being
informed about the rest of the lie detector examination as well.
As will be shown in the following subsection, the disclosure of
material that the operator promised or the subjects assumed
would be kept confidential undermines the accuracy of the examination. Ironically, the process of determining accuracy potentially reduces accuracy.
B.

The Interview Technique and its Dependence on
Confidentiality

1. The Need for Stimulation.-A subject who is unconcerned about the prospect of detection of deception will not be
anxious about lying and will not be susceptible to lie detection.
The operator ensures the concern for detection by various
"stimulation" procedures throughout the examination. In the
waiting period, the subject may peruse written materials that
attest to the infallibility of lie detection. In the pretest interview,
the operator asserts the accuracy and strength of the lie detector.
Later, in the card test, the operator demonstrates the effectiveness of the device. The card test is, of course, rigged, allowing the
operator to accurately discern which card the subject has picked,
regardless of the recorded physiological responses. The result of
this stimulation is frequently a confession to the crime under
investigation before any conclusion can be reached on the basis
of recorded responses, sometimes even before the lie detector is
actually connected to the subject. Direct questioning by the operator in the pretest interview obviates the need for further procedures if the subject admits to lying. At the same time, the operator tries to eliminate spurious causes of anxiety; the purpose of
revealing to the subject the exact wording of future questions is
to prevent any anxiety that would accompany surprise.
2. The Focus of the Stimulation: Irrelevant,Relevant, and
Control Questions.-The questions asked by the operator are de8. J. RE D & F. INBAU, supra note 1, at 42-43. Other control techniques are employed
in addition to the card test, such as the "silent answer" test and the "guilt complex" test.
Id. at 48-50, 127-34, 150.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss3/9
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signed to appropriately manipulate the anxiety of the subject
concerning different deceptions. This manipulation is accomplished through the "control question" technique. This technique
allows the operator to compare the subject's anxiety on three
different kinds of questions: (1) relevant questions, (2) irrelevant
questions, and (3) control questions. The relevant question is the
one under investigation; more than one relevant question may be
present in an examination. An irrelevant question concerns some
trivial matter, such as the subject's name or birthdate. The control question is designed to elicit a lie from the subject' and is
composed by the operator in the course of the pretest interview.
Ideally, the subject's anxiety about a deceptive response to the
control question serves as a point of comparison for the anxiety
that accompanies the responses to relevant questions. If the control question is properly composed, the subect who is truthful on
the relevant issue will be more anxious when answering the control question than the relevant question; conversely, the subject
who is deceptive on the relevant question will be less anxious
about his deception on the control question. If a subject is lying
to both the control question and the relevant question, but the
control question produces more concern, the operator may erroneously assume that the subject was truthful on the relevant
issue. A proper control question is thus essential to the accuracy
of the results.
(a) Composing the control question: obtaining unrelated
admissions.-Suppose the crime under investigation is the theft
of a horse owned by John Smith and the subject is the defendant.
The relevant question would be: "Did you steal Smith's horse?"
During the pretest interview, the operator might tentatively pose
as a control question: "Have you ever stolen anything?" If the
subject recently hijacked a railroad car filled with refrigerators,
he will have greater anxiety about the control question than the
relevant question. After being told that his answer to the control
question would be kept secret by the operator and that his cooperation is essential to the accuracy of the examination, the subject
might reveal the theft of refrigerators. The control question would
then be rephrased as follows: "Besides the incident involving refrigerators, have you ever stolen anything?" Presumably,
everyone has stolen something or at least contemplated it at some
9. Id. at 28-30.
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time. Thus, the operator can assume that a subject who answers
these questions negatively is being deceptive. One who answers
positively will go through a similar process of admission until the
control question must be answered negatively. In the example
above, the failure of the operator to make a credible promise of
confidentiality would hinder the formulation of an appropriate
control question because people are not ordinarily willing to make
incriminating statements regardless of whether the admission is
more serious than the relevant question. Similarly, regardless of
a promise, subjects who expect no confidentiality will not respond
properly to the interview technique. Thus, an accurate examination may produce an unrelated admission as an artifact of its
procedure.
Not only are the actual words of the control question determined through the pretest interview discussion, but the understanding between the operator and the subject concerning the
meaning of the words is determined. The openness of the subject
in creating a common definition of prior activity also hinges on
the prospect of confidentiality. The same control question can be
valid or invalid, depending upon different understandings;' 0 one
question would produce accurate results and the other would not.
Thus, one cannot judge the validity of a control question solely
on its content unless confidentiality and its accompanying
operator-subject rapport are assumed.
After the pretest interview has ended, the subject is connected to the lie detector and is asked the battery of questions
that he has helped formulate. The lie detector records the subject's physiological responses as he answers "yes" or "no" to each
of the questions. After the questions are asked the operator reminds the subject that any failure to be truthful will affect the
results. He also indicates that if something is bothering the subject, disclosure is essential if an inaccurate conclusion of deception is to be avoided." These remarks by the operator constitute
continuing stimulation of the subject's concern that his deception
10. For example, a control question might be worded: "Besides what you have told
me, have you ever stolen anything else?" The validity of the control question depends
upon what the subject understands it to mean, which in turn depends on the nature of
the theft still being concealed.
11. J. REID & F. INHAU, supra note 1, at 43, 44, 50.In the earlier edition of their book,
Reid and Inbau were more explicit concerning this exhortation. See J. REID & F. INBAu,
TRUTH AND DECEPrION 30 (1966). The degree of stimulation depends upon the responsiveness of the subject up to this point in the examination.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss3/9
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will be detected. The theory behind this particular stimulation is
that the subject who is deceptive about the relevant question will
believe detection imminent, and thus, his anxiety concerning the
relevant question will be heightened.2 The subject who is truthful
about the relevant question, however, will be more concerned
with the control question, since it is the only part of the examination that could register any deception for him. At this point in the
examination, before the card test or repetition of the first battery
of questions, the subject may further qualify the control question.
For example, he may now admit that he stole chickens from a
farm several years ago. The control question is then amended as
follows: "Beside the two thefts you told me about earlier, have
you ever stolen anything?" Through this process, an additional
unrelated admission has been obtained. Ironically, it is more
likely to come from a subject who is truthful about the relevant
question, since his major concern is the control question. Thus, a
defendant who truthfully denies criminal involvement and seeks
to prove it with a lie detector examination is more likely to make
unrelated admissions than is the subject who lies when asked the
relevant quesfion.
(b) The conflict of accuracy and confidentiality.-The operator's suggestion that the subject reveal anything bothering
him or any deception in the examination places the subject in a
difficult position. The subject must either make an unrelated
admission that qualifies the control question, or risk the prospect
of an unfavorable reading concerning the relevant question. Subjects who are deceptive to the relevant question may infer that
an unrelated admission will render a favorable outcome more
likely. The ability of the operator to induce cooperation from the
subject is evidenced by the high confession rate of those who fail
the examination; between fifty and eighty-five percent confess to
the operator." These confessions are the outgrowth of the operator's assertion that the lie detector will be able to pierce the
subject's effort to deceive. The exhortation to be truthful about
the control question is no less powerful.
The subject who is deceptive to the relevant question will
12. J. REID & F.

INBAU,

supra note 1, at 45-47.

13. People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 395 n.24, 255 N.W.2d 171, 189 n.24 (1977); R.
ARTHER & R. CAPUTO, INTERROGATION FOR INVESTIGATORS 161 (1959); C. LEE, THE INSTRUMENTAL DETECTION OF DECEPTION
TENN. L. REv. 743, 748 (1953).
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prefer to make unrelated admissions, particularly if they are less
serious than the crime under investigation. Ultimately, he may
confess to the relevant question as well. Similarly, the subject
who is truthful to the relevant question, but who fears being
branded as being deceptive, will prefer to make unrelated admissions that are less serious than what he is accused of doing by the
relevant question. The truthful subject may be more ready to
admit to crimes more serious than the relevant question to the
extent he abhors the false accusation, notwithstanding the potentially serious consequences of this approach. Unrelated admissions that concern more serious crimes may occur more frequently
for both subjects when the promise of confidentiality is particularly credible. In any case, however, these admissions are less
likely than those which are less serious.
The nature of the unrelated admissions bears on the accuracy of the results. Serious admissions indicate that the stimulation procedure has been successful because they show that the
subject has come to believe the ability of the operator to extract
the truth through the lie detector. Admissions also show that the
control question has been properly composed. A series of admissions of decreasing importance supports the accuracy of the results. Thus, to determine the accuracy of the lie detector results,
unrelated admissions are essential.
The problem posed by this relationship between the admission and the accuracy of the examination is twofold. To convince
an opposing party or the trier of fact of the accuracy of the results,
the admissions may lave to be disclosed. Conversely, if the examination is performed without a view toward convincing other persons of the subject's truthfulness, those other persons may nonetheless want the unrelated admissions to impeach the testimony
of the subject at trial. If opposing parties can regularly obtain
these admissions, the operator cannot credibly promise confidentiality; consequently, the accuracy of the examination suffers."
The first problem arises when the results of an examination are
14. The author is aware of no empirical data relating accuracy to the loss of confidentiality. The structure of the examination and its underlying theory suggest that the impact
is quite substantial. Confidentiality is an extension of the privacy necessary for lie detection related disciplines such as psychiatry and interrogation. See In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal.
3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970); R. AUBRY & R. CAPtrro, CRIMINAL
INTERROGATION 65 (1965); Fisher, The PsychotherapeuticProfessionand the Law of Privileged Communication, 10 WAYNE L. Rav. 609, 622-23 (1964).
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offered into evidence, and the second is posed whenever the opponent attempts to discover material for impeachment. These problems may be mitigated by the terms of an evidentiary stipulation.
(c) The disclosure of unrelatedadmissions necessary to introduce results into evidence.-The results of lie detector examinations are generally inadmissible as scientific evidence absent
stipulation between the prosecution and the defense. 5 In accepting a stipulation the trier of fact gives less scrutiny to the evidence it accepts, deferring to the adversary posture of the parties
as a safeguard. The role of unrelated admissions in the use of lie
detector results at trial depends upon the nature of the stipulation. Those who emphasize the value of the results and the precision of the lie detector technique would prefer to limit the trier's
inquiry to the result itself and to the qualifications of the examiner, and stipulations may be so drafted.15
15. Kaplan, The Lie Detector: An Analysis of Its Place in the Law of Evidence, 10
WAYNE L. REv. 381 (1964); Romero, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under the

New Mexico and FederalRules of Evidence, 6 NEW Max. L. REv. 187 (1976); Skolnick,
Scientific Theory and Scientific Evidence: An Analysis of Lie Detection, 70 YALE L.J. 694
(1961); Note, The Emergence of the Polygraphat Trial, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1120 (1973);
Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973); Annot., 23 A.L.R.2d 1306 (1952).
16. Reid and Inbau take a very strong position on this point, specifically recommending the following language in a stipulation for the admissibility of results:
Since the "control question" that is so essential to a diagnosis involves an
inquiry into possible wrongdoing (even to the extent constituting a crime) of a
type similar to, though almost invariably of a lesser degree than the matter
under inquiry, if the case is to be tried by a jury, the actual control question
shall not be revealed to the jury, nor shall there be any disclosure of the answer
to it . . . there shall be no disclosures of any admissions made to the examiner
by the person tested as the examiner was developing and formulating the control
question, and this understanding shall prevail even if the case is to be tried by
the judge alone.
J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 1, at 344-45. Nonetheless, parties have not always taken
their advice. E.g., State v. Stowers, 580 S.W.2d 516 (Mo. App. 1979); State v. Bennett,
17 Or. App. 197, 521 P.2d 31 (1974). In State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d 1343
(1972), the stipulation specifically provided for "the admission into evidence of all questions, answers and results of said polygraph test which are applicable and germane to the
charge herein of Second Degree Assault.

.

. whether favorable or unfavorable ...

"

Id.

at 64 n.1, 497 P.2d at 1345 n.1.
While concern has been expressed that a contrary rule would promote convictions
based on the "bad man" brand of related admissions, Reid and Inbau recommend that
more serious admissions should not survive the operator's promise of confidentiality. J.
REID & F. INBAU, supra note 1, at 50 n.56, 366. No standard of "seriousness" is suggested.
Stipulations are drawn by the parties through negotiation and may provide for different
results. People v. Flowers, 14 Ill. 2d 406, 152 N.E.2d 838 (1958). Moreover, an ambiguous
stipulation may be read by the court to encompass only the operator's opinion. State v.
Hancock, 164 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa 1969) (Becher, J., dissenting).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

13

482

South
Carolina
Law Review,
31, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 9[Vol.
LAWVol.REVIEW
CAROLINA
SOUTH

31

In those jurisdictions in which results are admissible through
stipulation, courts have nonetheless emphasized the need for full
cross-examination and for demonstrating the validity of the results proffered.' 7 Given the role that unrelated admissions play in
the accuracy of the results, these courts should allow and require
disclosure of unrelated admissions as part of the process of determining the weight of evidence. The issue was raised and resolved
by requiring disclosure in State v. Bennett. 8 The defendant was
accused of burglarizing an apartment and attempting to rape the
occupant. The prosecution and defense stipulated to the admissibility of the results of a lie detector examination that the police
were to administer to the defendant. During the examination,
however, the defendant admitted to a similar incident that had
occurred several months before the alleged crime. The trial court
found that disclosure of the incident was essential to show that
the examination had been properly conducted and admitted it
over the defendant's objection.' 9 The appellate court affirmed.
When a party attempts to lay a foundation for the'admission
of lie detector results as scientific evidence, absent stipulation, as
17. State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); State v. Lassley, 218 Kan. 758,
545 P.2d 383 (1976); State v. McDavitt, 62 N.J. 36, 297 A.2d 849 (1972); State v. Ross, 7
Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d 1343 (1972); see also United States v. Zeiger, 350 F. Supp. 685
(D.D.C.) rev'd, 475 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
18. 17 Or. App. 197, 521 P.2d 31 (1974).
19. Following the defendant's objection concerning the earlier incident, the trial court
ruled as follows:
10. It was necessary at that point to determine whether the "prior incident" was relevant and material to the testimony of the expert witness reporting
on the results of the polygraph examination. All of the 12 questions and answers
put to the defendant were received in evidence without objection. Lieutenant
Riegel was then asked by me whether he could interpret those answers without
reference to the prior incident which, incidentally, had been discussed by the
defendant with him during the pretest interview, a necessary part of the examination. Lieutenant Riegel replied that he could not. I then ruled that the original
stipulation to receive the results of the examination necessarily .encompassed
receipt of all matters which were relevant and material to interpret those results.
Lieutenant Riegel then testified that while deceptive responses were shown as
to the remaining questions, he was not wholly satisfied that the defendant's
mind was "cleared" of the prior incident, and hence he could not state that the
deceptive responses to the questions concerning [the victim] constituted deception concerning the crime involving her unaffected by the earlier incident.
11. It was my judgment and remains my judgment that a proper evaluation of the results of a polygraph examination requires the whole picture, not a
partial account. The matter of the "prior incident" came up in the first instance
because of the careful professional manner in which Lieutenant Riegel conducted his examination and qualified his testimony.
Id. at 202, 521 P.2d at 31-35.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss3/9

14

Axelrod: The Need for an
Evidentiary
Privilege
for the Use of Lie Detector
LiE
DETECTOR
PRIVILEGE
1980]

some courts have invited, the judge should allow the opponent to
probe the matter of unrelated admissions. No lack of scrutiny by
the trier of fact should be excused by the mutual consent of the
parties.
C.

The Admissibility of Evidence Derived from Lie
Detector Examination

The lie detector examination can create adverse results, confessions, and unrelated admissions. If all of these were inadmissible, the risk of disclosure would not include the risk of damaging
evidence. As previously discussed, the admissibility of the results
turns on the stipulation of the parties. The admissions and confessions, however, are independently admissible. Whether they
come to the opponent's attention" through an offer of proof concerning the results or by some means of discovery, admissions and
confessions can profoundly influence the credibility of a witness
and the outcome of a case.
Cases focusing on the evidentiary use of confessions and unrelated admissions usually concern a defendant as subject, rather
than a witness. Additionally, the control question tends to be
similar to the relevant question in the examination, and therefore
the unrelated admission is more likely to have an explicitly criminal aspect for the defendant and will be more likely to form the
2
basis of impeachment or prosecution. '
The importance of unrelated admissions and confessions overshadows the results themselves as far as police agencies are
concerned. While the results may be difficult to place before the
trier of fact, admissions and confessions are not. For example, in
20. The usefulness of the lie detector results to the defense often depends upon their
publication. The defense attorney who hopes to raise bail money or obtain a favorable plea
bargain must notify the appropriate parties of the examination. If an attempt is made to
obtain a stipulation of the admissibility of results, the defense attorney usually notifies
the prosecutor before the examination is actually taken. Often, it is the "opponent" who
arranges the examination. In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), the Court
noted that defendant admitted to stealing $375 from his employer. The admission took
place in a police lie detector examination to determine if the defendant committed a
murder. Id. at 446, 485.
21. The nature of admissions made by witnesses relates to the control question used.
The control question concerns activity similar to the relevant question. For a defendant,
the control question concerns criminal activity. For a witness, prior instances of lying or
bias against the state or defense are suitable subject material, since the relevant question
will concern the truth of his testimony.
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State v. Blosser" an accused kidnaper-rapist was given a lie detector examination by the state police. No attempt was made to
introduce the results, since there had been no prior stipulation.

On defendant's motion, the trial court suppressed the use of admissions made during the examination regarding the defendant's
escapades with numerous previous women, none of whom had
lodged complaints. The defendant also told the operator, during

the examination, that he had restrained the victim and forced her
to have intercourse. His theory before the trial court was that the
inadmissibility of the results, absent stipulation, implied that no
other part of the examination could be introduced into evidence.
Noting that the lie detector had previously been used as an inves-

tigatory device to aid in the securing of admissions, the appellate
court held, following the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions

that have considered the issue,23 that admissions, if otherwise
22. 221 Kan. 59, 558 P.2d 105 (1976).
23. E.g., Keiper v. Kupp, 509 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1975); Saney v. Montaye, 500 F.2d
411 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. McDevitt, 328 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1964); People v.
Flowers, 14 11.2d 406, 152 N.E.2d 838 (1958); State v. Hancock, 164 N.W.2d 330 (Iowa
1969); State v. Blosser, 221 Kan. 59, 558 P.2d 105 (1976); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281
(Me. 1975); State v. Ghan, 558 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. App. 1977); State v. Faller, 88 S.D. 685,
227 N.W.2d 433 (1975); Jones v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 723, 204 S.E.2d 247 (1974); State
v. DeHart, 42 Wis. 562, 8 N.W.2d 360 (1943).
Courts nonetheless have recognized that a lie detector examination is part of the
totality of circumstances surrounding a statement from which voluntariness must be
determined. State v. Franks, 239 N.W.2d 588 (Iowa 1976) (threats by lie detector operator
invalidated subsequent confession); State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281 (Me. 1975); Johnson
v. State, 31 Md. App. 303, 355 A.2d 504 (1976) (reversing the trial court because the jury
did not know a lie detector examination accompanied the confession, a fact essential to a
determination of voluntariness); People v. Leonard, 59 A.D.2d 1, 397 N.Y.S.2d 386 (1977)
(lie detector examination administered as part of continuing coercive tactics by police).
Some courts, however, have been alarmed at the prospect that the jury, in hearing about
the existence of a test, will presume the defendant was found to be deceptive, and will
convict him on that ground. Ironically, the inadmissibility of the results exacerbates the
problem and these courts have allowed proof of a statement only in the absence of any
reference to the fact that a lie detector examination was in progress at the time. State v.
Varos, 69 N.M. 19, 363 P.2d 629 (1961); State v. Green, 271 Or. 153, 531 P.2d 245 (1975).
In Varos, the prosecution had introduced the defendant's statement along with its surrounding circumstance, the lie detector examination. In reversing, the court held that
[tihe statement and the addition thereto are apparently admissible and could
have been proven by the state without reference to the test on the machine. The
fallacy here was allowing the jury to have the detailed account of the machine
and the circumstances of its use, when this evidence could only have had a
prejudicial effect on the defendant.
69 N.M. at 22, 363 P.2d at 613. Only two cases have been found that are arguably contrary
to the result in Blosser. In State v. Cunningham, 324 So. 2d 173 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975),
a Florida defendant charged with robbery took a lie detector test with a stipulation that
the results would be admissible. During the test he was asked about previous robberies
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competent, are not rendered inadmissible because they are acquired in the course of a lie detector examination.14 This overwhelming majority has considered the question because confessions are so frequently the product of a lie detector examination.
D.

The Need to Protect Against the Disclosure of Admissions

The capacity of the lie detector examination to produce confessions and unrelated admissions from the subject does not exist
for the police lie detector operator only. The structure of the
examination requires unrelated admissions and creates such a
strong feeling concerning the infallibility of the lie detector on the
part of the subject that confessions also frequently result in defense examinations. The lie detector has an independent use,
however, as a relatively accurate procedure for determining
whether the subject is truthful as to a specific question. If an
attorney cannot use the lie detector for this purpose without risking the creation of extremely valuable evidence for his opponent, he will be unwilling to use the examination. Moreover, the
examination itself would not have adequate confidentiality to
produce unrelated admissions. The usefulness of the lie detector
to determine the subject's truthfulness, therefore, depends upon
the ability of the operator to withstand requests to disclose the
subject's admissions, except when the subject allows such disclosure. The ability to withstand disclosure and to thus withhold
admissible evidence from a party or from the trier of fact turns
and any deaths that might have occurred in them. Upon being told by the examiner that
a false answer to his question might invalidate the rest of the examination, the subject
admitted to a robbery-murder unrelated to the accusation of the pending criminal charge.
He was indicted for this separate crime and was convicted through the use of the statements. The appellate court reversed the conviction on the ground that the stipulation
referred only to the original case and that the statements in the pretest interview were
part of the stipulated "results." The stipulation was construed as precluding the admission of any of the results in any other case. This view of the stipulation is strange in that
a prior stipulation for admissibility is only necessary for the operator's opinion of the
physiological responses. The Supreme Court of Florida later distinguished the case insofar
as it could be held to have prevented the use of otherwise competent admissions by a
defendant during a lie detector examination. Burch v. State, 343 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 1977);
accord, Hostzclaw v. State, 351 So. 2d 970 (Fla. 1977).
A similar exception arose in State v. Thompson, 30 Or. App. 379, 567 P.2d 132 (1977),
in which a full confession made during a pretest interview was found to be erroneously
admitted. In Thompson the court found that defendant reasonably believed that the
results, including the interview, would be communicated only to the attorneys and that
as a matter of fair play the confession should be suppressed.
24. 221 Kan. at 62, 558 P.2d at 108.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

17

South
Carolina
Law Review,
31, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 9[Vol.
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAWVol.
REVIEW

31

upon the availability of a legal doctrine for that purpose. Arguably, the operator may be prevented from making these disclosures
because of the attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, or the fifth amendment bar against compelled selfincrimination. The next section of this article discusses why these
doctrines are inadequate to protect confidentiality.
III.

PROTECTION OF ADMISSIONS FROM DIscLosuRE UNDER CURRENT

LAW

In the previous section, it was shown that the lie detector
examination frequently gives rise to admissions by the subject
concerning the crime under investigation or unrelated criminal
activity. The use of these admissions for impeachment and for
substantive evidence of guilt makes an examination potentially
risky. For example, a defendant charged with one burglary would
be ill-advised to attempt to exonerate himself through lie detection if, assuming he passed the examination, he admitted to another burglary, and that admission were available to the prosecution. Another problem with disclosure concerns the accuracy of
lie detector results. If a credible promise25 of confidentiality cannot be made by the operator for unrelated admissions, the physiological responses are difficult to interpret. Therefore, the prospect of disclosure is threatening to both the use and the usefulness of lie detectors. This section examines legal doctrines that
may offer protection against this disclosure. Unfortunately, in
each case the protection offered is inadequate and hence it is
necessary to consider a new privilege specifically designed to protect against disclosure of unrelated admissions.
The process by which one party seeks information in possession of the other is called discovery. In criminal cases the maximum limit to the compelled exchange of information is set by
common law and statutes. Statutory discovery has become so
broad that other limitations on the exchange of information have
become significant. 6 The work-product doctrine limits discovery
in such a way that each adversary is given an incentive to find
and analyze factual material in the course of preparing for litigation. Nonetheless, only qualified protection is given to informa25. See note 3 supra.
26. When there is no statutory or common-law provision for discovery it has not been
necessary for courts to consider other limitations.
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tion thus gathered; the protection dissolves upon a showing by
the opponent that the information is crucial for his preparation
and is otherwise difficult to obtain. 27 The factors that a court
considers in preserving work-product protection are not limited
to things known at the time information is gathered. Workproduct protection for lie detector examination is thus unsatisfactory because the attorney cannot assess the risk of disclosure
before the examination and the operator cannot meaningfully
promise confidentiality when he tests the subject. Less qualified
protection is available in the form of privilege, but the coverage
of lie detection is questionable. A privilege provides protection
from disclosure on the theory that a relationship or transaction
important in a societal context would be harmed if certain material were revealed. The attorney-client privilege, for example,
protects communications between an attorney and a client on the
theory that the prospect of disclosure would inhibit the communication of all clients with their attorneys.2 8 The privilege thus protects the relationship between an attorney and a client. In terms
of predictability of disclosure at the time of communication, an
absolute privilege offers an enormous advantage over the workproduct doctrine. Once the relationship upon which the privilege
is based has been established, the parties can proceed on the
assumption that disclosure cannot be compelled. The attorneyclient privilege, however, offers little protection for admissions
made in the lie detector examination. It does not apply to nonclient subjects, and even for clients, the privilege may not apply
to communications to lie detector operators. Similarly, the privilege against self-incrimination 9 is inadequate.
Privileges have been disfavored by courts because they exclude reliable evidence. Courts cannot do their job of determining
truth without such evidence. The privilege proposed in Section V
should escape this judicial hostility because lie detectors aid
rather than interfere with the truthfinding process.
There is currently no doctrine or privilege that adequately
protects lie detector information from disclosure. This section will
examine the trend of discovery toward greater disclosure and the
inadequacy of discovery limitations furnished by the work27. See Section II.B.
28. See Section I.C.
29. See Section M.D.
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product doctrine, the attorney-client privilege, and the fifth
amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. The
question of whether any lie detector information should be immune from disclosure is crucial to the continued use of lie detectors. The answer to that question should, therefore, take into
account the usefulness of the device to the criminal justice system; none of the protections considered in this section does so.
The consideration of a new specific privilege is, in fact, a consideration of the usefulness of lie detectors. That consideration is a
more appropriate process to determine the requisite protection
than an attempt to stretch general discovery rules, work-product
doctrine, or extant privileges to achieve protection from disclosure.
In the next section, the constitutional limitations on adequate protection are discussed. This section is concerned with
doctrines that fail to provide enough protection; the following
section" considers a doctrine that requires disclosure rather than
protecting against it.
A.

Discovery Rules

If there were no provision for the exchange of information
between parties in a criminal case, it would be unnecessary to
consider specific sources of protection from disclosure; the parties
could simply refrain from releasing information they had gathered. The evolution of judicial thought toward the proposition
that mutual disclosure is both desirable and fair, as well as constitutionally permissible, suggests a hostility to suppression of
evidence in the form of protection from disclosure and an attitude
of narrowly construing such protection when it is accepted."
Historically, formal discovery in criminal cases was virtually
unknown. The prevalent judicial attitude was that discovery was
inherently unfair to the prosecution and unnecessary for several
reasons. 2 First, a defendant's actual gain was thought to be quite
small, since the guilty already knew the facts and the innocent
30. See Section IV.
31. See sources cited in note 32 infra.
32. Compare State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953) with State v. Johnson,
28 N.J. 133, 145 A.2d 313 (1958). See generally, Nakell, CriminalDiscovery for the Defense
and Prosecution:The Developing ConstitutionalConsiderations,50 N.C.L. REv. 437, 43949 (1972); Zagel & Cart, State Criminal Discovery and the New Illinois Rules, 1971 U.

ILL. L.F. 557.
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did not need to know.33 Second, a defendant was likely to abuse
what the government gave him by suborning perjury, intimidating witnesses, or perjuring himself.3 4 One purpose of discovery,

however, was to eliminate unfair adversarial advantage. Since the
defendant was thought to have an impenetrable fortress of constitutional protection, precluding any disclosure to the prosecution,
discovery by the defense created precisely that disfavored adversarial advantage.
A much narrower view of the defendant's constitutional protection has accompanied the movement towards substantial disclosure by both the defense and the prosecution. Subject to due
process standards of reciprocity, the prosecution can compel the
defense to disclose many items once thought shielded by the defendant's fifth amendment privilege. Disclosure of witness lists,
affirmative defenses, scientific reports, and even witness state33. The defendant would "know" whether or not he was guilty and, therefore, the
information the state possessed could hardly, in any unfair sense, surprise him.
The most articulate exposition of this reasoning is found in State v. Tune, 13 N.J.
203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953), discussed in Brennan, The CriminalProsecution:Sporting Event
or Quest for the Truth?, 1963 WASH. U.L.Q. 279. The pessimism of the courts concerning
the good faith needed by a defendant for discovery was illustrated in In re DiJoseph's
Petition, 394 Pa. 19, 145 A.2d 187 (1958), in which the defendant was denied a photograph
of fingerprints found on the alleged murder weapon:
I believe that a person who asserts his innocence of a crime . . . is entitled to
examine prosecution exhibits which are reasonably associated with the theory
of guilt and of which he probably may be unaware. However, where an exhibit
is one of which the accused is entirely cognizant and already knows whether it
could or could not be an item of incrimination against him, he is not entitled to
its inspection if such inspection would hamper the Commonwealth in proceeding with its case .

. .

. She is the one person who knows whether she used the

weapon or not and, therefore, she is not being denied anything which she needs
in the ascertainment of the truth.
Id. at 24-25, 145 A.2d at 189 (Musmanno, J., concurring).
34. In criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts that often
discovery will lead not to honest fact finding, but on the contrary to perjury and
the suppression of evidence. Thus the criminal who is aware of the whole case
against him will often procure perjured testimony in order to set up a false
defense. Another result of full discovery would be that the criminal defendant
who is informed of the names of all of the state's witnesses may take steps to
bribe or frighten them into giving perjured testimony or into absenting themselves so that they are unavailable to testify.
State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953) (citations omitted). An extension
of this reasoning was rejected in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972), in which the
court held unconstitutional a law requiring the defendant to testify before any of his
witnesses. The prospect that a defendant could tailor his testimony improperly if he could
first hear his own witnesses testify was found to be a legitimate cause of state concern,
but not sufficient to justify a burden on his fifth amendment rights.
35. See State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 211-12, 98 A.2d 881, 885 (1953).
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ments are commonly provided for in discovery rules." While some
jurisdictions may still have such narrow discovery rules that all
lie detector information can be protected, the majority explicitly
allows disclosure of some materials that may include lie detector
information or preserves the discretion of the trial court judge to
order such disclosure." Protection must be sought from specific
doctrines extrinsic to the discovery rules themselves.
B.

The Work-Product Doctrine

The scope of the work-product doctrine adopted by a particular jurisdiction indicates its attitude concerning discovery in general and is frequently incorporated in court rules or reflected in
the exercise of judicial discretion. Because it offers only a qualified protection, the ambit of which cannot be predicted at the
time of the lie detector examination, the doctrine does not sufficiently protect lie detector admissions. The work-product doctrine, however, is important to examine in some detail because it
so aptly embraces the arguments for protection, failing only in its
limited scope. The qualified nature of its protection has found
favor with courts leery of excluding normally admissible evidence
such as admissions. These characteristics of the work-product
doctrine will be useful in the analysis of the attorney-client privilege, which often protects material that is, coincidentally, work
product. To the extent that the same function is carried out by
both kinds of protection, the attorney-client privilege should not
apply because of its absolute exclusion of relevant evidence.
1. The Purpose and Definition of Work Product.-The
adversary system assumes that each side will diligently investigate the facts of a dispute and will carefully analyze the relevant
law.3" The exchange of information between parties is useful be36. The federal courts and most state courts now formally provide for the routine
exchange of many items that the parties intend to present at trial, including the names
of prospective witnesses, scientific reports, and physical evidence. See generally Wardius
v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; Zagel & Carr, supra note 32. This
apparent reduction of the defendant's protection was cited by the Supreme Court of
California in providing for state discovery of medical reports the defendant intended to
introduce at trial. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 372 P.2d 919, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879
(1962). The scope of the fifth amendment privilege is more closely examined in section
III.D.
37. Zagel & Carr, supra note 32, at 562-71 & 600 app. A.
38. See Developments in the Law: Discovery, 74 HARv. L. REv. 940, 1032 (1961). See
also Eagan v. DeManio, 294 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1974).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss3/9

22

Axelrod: The Need for an
Evidentiary
Privilege
for the Use of Lie Detector
LIE
DETECTOR
PRIVILEGE
1980]

cause it maximizes the information likely to be presented to the
trier of fact. Nonetheless, the exchange also poses a problem for
the adversary system. Vigorous investigation and analysis of a
case is deterred if the fruits of one side's labor are automatically
available to the opponent. Hickman v. Taylor39 resolved this conflict by protecting material prepared for litigation from disclosure
unless the opponent could show that it was essential to his preparation and that it was difficult to obtain independently; Hickman
characterized the protected materials as "work product."
In civil cases, the trend toward comprehensive discovery has
narrowed the scope of work product.'" In criminal cases, however,
the doctrine applied is broader than that in civil cases, yet narrower than the version that first appeared in Hickman. Hickman
indicates the largest scope of materials that will receive protection under the work-product doctrine. Interjurisdictional variation of the scope of work product is substantial because the doctrine is not constitutionally based; the doctrine can thus be freely
changed by statute or court decision. In some form, it explicitly
or implicity influences many criminal discovery decisions.4'
Broadly defined, work product is material prepared by or for an
attorney specifically for the purpose of litigation. As will be seen,
different kinds of this sort of material have received varying protection in criminal discovery.
2. Hickman v. Taylor.-Hickman was the first Supreme
Court test of the civil discovery rules enacted in 1937. In the
aftermath of a tugboat accident, suit was brought on behalf of
one of the deceased crewmen. The defense attorney interviewed
the witnesses to the sinking; some of the interviews were tran39. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
40. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26; Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895,
903.
41. E.g., State v. Edgecombe, 275 So. 2d 740 (La. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 1075
(1973) (all of prosecutors' materials presumptively privileged); State v. Hicks, 515 S.W.2d
519 (Mo. 1974) (police reports obtainable because of defendant's showing of materiality
and unfairness of denial); State v. Tackett, 78 N.M. 450, 432 P.2d 415 (1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 1026 (1968) (defendant must show particularized need to discover prosecutor's
material); State v. Davis, 282 N.C. 107, 191 S.E.2d 664 (1972) (prosecutor's investigative
materials need not be disclosed); Stidham v. State, 507 P.2d 1312 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973)
(availability to cross examine witness at preliminary hearing obviates defense need to
discover witness statement in prosecutor's file). But see Craig v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.
App. 3d 416, 126 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1976) (denying the applicability of work product to
California criminal discovery).
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scribed but others were not. Shortly thereafter, the witnesses testified at a public hearing concerning the accident. What the
plaintiff sought, under the new rules, was to have the defense
attorney provide a copy of the written interviews and reduce to
writing the oral interviews he had conducted. The defense objected on the grounds that an attorney's files were not the proper
subject of discovery and that the new rules should not be so
interpreted.
The Court did not see itself as fashioning new doctrine, but
rather as restating that which was already implicit in the discovery process prior to the rules-discovery should enhance the adversary system of trial." The Court feared that the availability
of an attorney's files would discourage him from writing things
down and from giving full advice to his clients. 3 The discoverability of the attorney's advice, research, and strategy would deter
him from developing or communicating them fully, because his
efforts would assist his opponent. Moreover, requiring the defense
attorney to reduce oral interviews to writing would inevitably
compromise his role as an officer of the court, since he might be
called as a witness for impeachment or corroboration. At the
same time, the Court did not wish to allow one party to withhold
important material that might affect the accuracy of the factfinding process. Thus, even work product could be disclosed if the
opponent were able to show that the material was essential to the
adequate preparation of the case and that it could not otherwise
be obtained without undue hardship.
Two distinct policies are suggested by the scope of material
Hickman includes in work product. One policy is the encouragement of each party to vigorously investigate its case. Thus, a
party should not generally benefit from the efforts of his opponent, lest indolence be rewarded. Any material, regardless of its
source, is protected by this policy. The second policy is the preservation of an attorney's privacy concerning his mental impressions
of his case. An attorney haunted by the prospect of having his
strategic memoranda disclosed will be a less effective advocate.
Moreover, no benefit relevant to the merits of the case will accrue
to the opponent if this sort of invasive discovery is allowed.
Courts have given greater deference to the second policy44 and the
42. 329 U.S. at 509-11.
43. Id. at 510-11.
44. See People v. Moore, 50 Cal. App. 3d 989, 994, 123 Cal. Rptr. 837, 840 (1975);
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Supreme Court has recently characterized it as lying at the core
of the work-product doctrine. 5 Protection of verbatim accounts
of witness interviews is predicated almost entirely on the first
policy; protection of internal legal memoranda is based on both
the first and the second.
In keeping with its analysis, the Court in Hick-man found the
witness interviews to be within the scope of work product." To
decide whether the interviews were nonetheless discoverable, the
Court still needed to determine whether they were essential to the
plaintiff's preparation and unavailable absent undue hardship.
As these were the only witnesses, the substance of their statements was essential to preparation. Concerning the availability
of the material to the plaintiff, the Court noted that the witnesses
were still accessible for interview and the text of their public
statements was a matter of public record. The decision in
Hickman therefore declined to allow plaintiff to discover defen47
dant's work product.
Contrary to the holding of Hickman, many jurisdictions have
removed witness statements from the scope of work-product protection in criminal discovery. 4 A party who intends to call a
Note, Discovery: New Jersey Work-ProductDoctrine, 1 RuT.-CAM. L. REv. 346, 348 (1969);
Comment, Basic Survey of Work Product in Federal and State Jurisdictionin Civil and
CriminalProceedings, 35 TENN. L. REv. 474 (1968). But see United States v. Brown, 478
F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1974) (I.R.S. investigation case in which an attorney's notes were
arguably more than impressions, were a unique source of information for the Internal
Revenue Service, and were therefore not absolutely protected). See also Duplan Corp. v.
Moulinage et Retorderie de Chavanoz, 509 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
997 (1975); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 187 (M.D.
Fla. 1973); Monier v. Chamberlain, 35 Ill. 2d 351, 221 N.E.2d 410 (1966).
45. In United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975), the Court held that requiring
disclosure of an investigator's notes from witness interviews implicated the work-product
doctrine. Although the Court ultimately held that any protection afforded by the doctrine
was waived by having the investigator testify concerning the substance of the interview,
the Court discussed the doctrine at some length. After reviewing Hickman, the Court
noted that "at its core, the work product doctrine shelters the mental process of the
attorney, providing a privileged area within which he can analyze and prepare his client's
case." Id. at 238. Accord, Goldberg v. United States, 425 U.S. 94, 106 (1976).
46. 329 U.S. at 509.
47. Id. at 512.
48. See Zagel & Carr, supra note 32, 600 app. A (I)(B) & (II)(G). The subservience
of the work-product doctrine to legislative decision is shown by Goldberg v. United States,
425 U.S. 94 (1976), in which the government resisted certain discovery under 18 U.S.C. §
3500 (1976) and contended that the statute should incorporate work product as an inherent limitation on defense discovery. The Act requires the prosecutor to tender to the
defense the written statements of witnesses who have already testified on direct examination. The government's position was that certain statements reflected discussions between
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witness at trial must frequently make advance interviews with
that witness available to opposing counsel. To the extent that the
material gathered for trial can be characterized as analysis or as
the product of an attorney's mental process, it is more likely to
have work-product protection. Thus, scientific tests of witnesses
and of physical evidence may receive greater protection than

mere witness interviews.49
3. The Application of the Work-Product Doctrine to Lie
Detectors.-Lie detector information is arguably part of the
attorney's work product because it is prepared for him with particular litigation in mind. The examination is composed of both
an interview and an expert analysis of that interview, each of
which may receive work-product treatment. 0
witnesses and government attorneys that would suggest the government's legal analysis
of the case. The Court looked to legislative history and rejected any incorporation of the
doctrine in the Act. 425 U.S. at 101-02. It also refused to temper its construction of the
stptute to preserve work-product protection, since the plain wording of the Act did not
suggest any such protection. Id. at 102. Although Goldbergmay be said to have construed
the Act to coincidentally avoid confrontation with the mental processes aspect of the
doctrine, its priorities are clear. Moreover, the Act itself, in providing prosecution witness
statements to the defense, is inconsistent with the Hickman work-product rule, which
would otherwise require the defense to show the statements were important and otherwise
unavailable. See Craig v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 416, 126 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1976).
Alternatively, the work-product doctrine can be viewed as subservient to the discretion
of the trial court judge to allow adequate cross-examination of witnesses. See United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 249 (1975) (White, J., concurring).
49. Although not as frequently reported, instances of witness testing by police and
prosecution are common. Often the defendant in a case was merely a witness when he took
a police lie detector test. After his confession during the test, he became a defendant.
Concerning prosecutorial examination of witnesses, see Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal.
2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966); Zupp v. State, 258 Ind. 625, 283 N.E.2d
540 (1972); State v. Taylor, 139 N.J. Super. 301, 353 A.2d 555 (1976).
50. The work-product treatment of lie detector information is suggested by the reasoning of cases that presumptively shield from discovery the fruits of the prosecutor's
investigation. See McCorvey v. State, 339 So. 2d 1053 (Ala. Crim. App. 1976)
("investigator's product" prevents disclosure of defendant's statement taken by police
investigator); Berger v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 473, 467 P.2d 61 (1970); Corbin v.
Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 465, 445 P.2d 441 (1968); People v. Moore, 50 Cal. App. 3d 987,
123 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1975); Colebook v. State, 205 So. 2d 675, 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968)
vacated and remanded on othergrounds sub nom, Jones v. Florida, 394 U.S. 720 (1969);
Curtis v. State, 518 P.2d 1288 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974). In Rose v. State, 427 S.W.2d 609
(Tex. Crim. App. 1968), the court found that a statement authored by the prosecutor to
"guide" the witness in testimony was protected as a form of work product. Cf. United
States v. Barber, 296 F. Supp. 795, 801 (D. Del. 1969) (protecting "internal" F.B.I. memoranda). In many of these instances, courts have highlighted the mental process aspect of
an investigator's work, particularly in the case of police officers. E.g., State v. Winsett,
57 Del. 344, 200 A.2d 237 (1964), holding that
(tihe results of polygraph tests, blood tests, and fingerprint examinations. ..
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The maximum available protection of both the admissions
and the results of a lie detector examination will be achieved if
three obstacles can be surmounted. First, the gathering of information by the operator, rather thai by the attorney himself, must
not diminish protection. Second, the material must be shown to
possess the characteristics of work product. Third, it must be
unlikely that the opposing party can make an adequate showing
to overcome work-product protection. In considering these issues,
it should be borne in mind that even if all the difficulties are
resolved, a legislative decision requiring disclosure will prevail.
Since criminal attorneys freely use investigators, the utilization of the work-product doctrine to encourage vigorous investigation would be meaningless if only the material that the attorney
gathered personally were protected.-' Besides lie detection, considerable forensic expertise has developed for criminal cases. Except for those experts the party intends to call as witnesses at
trial, most jurisdictions make no provision for discovery; they
group experts and investigators with attorneys, under the same
work-product umbrella. 2 Lie detector operators should be treated
similarly, even though they may not be regularly employed investigators, since their independence from the attorney is essential
to the accuracy of their results because of their need to appear
neutral to the subject. 3 An independent expert, who is not a
are developed factually by the police as investigators. This is to say that they
are obtained by the police qua police in their investigation of crime. This kind
of information, in its broadest sense, arises out of the analytical or investigative
phase of police effort. It is the work product of detection, at least as distinguished from the mere gathering or collection of tangibles which could be done
by anyone physically present at a given time and place.
Id. at 349, 200 A.2d at 239. Accord, Feehery v. State, 480 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Crim. App.
1972) (laboratory testing of seized drug).
51. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238-39 n.13 (1975).
52. In the federal system, for example, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
provide that
[u]pon request of a defendant the government shall permit the defendant to
inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental
examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments, or copies thereof, which are
within the possession, custody, or control of the government, the existence of
which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the
attorney for the government, and which are material to the preparationof the
defense or are intended for use by the government as evidence in chief at the
trial.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(D) (emphasis added).
53. An operator who presumes the subject is lying is likely to act in an accusatory
fashion, thereby impeding any valid assessment of the subject's anxiety and rendering the
operator ineffective. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 1, at 17.
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regular part of the prosecution or defense "team," should be protected to encourage accurate investigation. 4
Assuming the work-product character of the examination,
the question of the scope of the protection suited to that activity
remains. A stronger case can be made for protecting the results
of lie detector examinations than for protecting other statements
made in the course of the examination. The rationale for protecting the results depends in part on the limited admissibility of the
results as evidence and in part on the degree to which the results
can be likened to an attorney's mental impressions.
(a) Application to results.-Absent stipulation, lie detector examination results have rarely been admitted in criminal

cases."5 Work-product protection for the results is very strong
because in the absence of an evidentiary role the results can

rarely be shown to be important in the preparation of the opponent's case. The result of the examination is simply the conclu-

sion that the witness is being truthful or deceptive in response to
a specific question. It is functionally identical to an attorney's
mental impression. Its usefulness will be limited to a strategic

consideration by the attorney of the desirability of calling the
witness and of the necessity of establishing facts through alterna54. Reid and Inbau assume, based upon the federal rule, that the umbrella would
not extend to lie detector experts. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra note 1, at 346. The contrary
result is indicated by United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975). United States v.
McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967), demonstrates an earlier, less expansive approach to
work product.
55. E.g., State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962); Codie v. State, 313 So.
2d 754 (Fla. 1975); State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d 1343 (1972); State v. Stanislawski, 62 Wis. 730, 216 N.W.2d 8 (1974). Other jurisdictions have approved admission of
the results on an episodic basis, upon being swayed by equitable considerations resulting
from a fait accompli agreement from which one of the parties seeks to withdraw. E.g.,
United States v. Oliver, 525 F.2d 731 (8th Cir. 1975) cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973 (1976);
People v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P.2d 937 (1948); State v. McNamara, 252 Iowa
19, 104 N.W.2d 568 (1960); State v. Towns, 35 Ohio App. 2d 237, 301 N.E.2d 700 (1973).
A few instances also exist in which individual courts have admitted results on the ground
that an adequate foundation for expert testimony had been established, United States v.
Zieger, 350 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1972), reu'd, 472 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United
States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972), or have provided for the possibility
that an adequate foundation for lie detector expert testimony could be established. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974). A number of federal
circuits have, as an abstract matter, underscored the plausibility of supplying an adequate
foundation for unstipulated lie detector results under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See
note 164 infra. It is clear, however, that a trial court will generally not be reversed for
exercising discretion against admission. United States v. Glover, 596 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Infelice, 506 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107
(1975).
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tive means. It has no relation to the merits of the case; rather, it
is simply an impression of the credibility of the witness. For the
purpose of discovery, the results are indistinguishable from
memoranda between co-counsel concerning their personal impressions of the credibility of each potential witness. Aside from
insight into the party's strategy, which the doctrine does not indulge, the only legitimate value the results hold for the opponent
would be the incentive to engage in further investigation concerning the credibility of the witness tested. If the determination of
the credibility of the witness were essential to the opponent's
preparation for litigation, the incentive probably would be unnecessary in most instances anyway,5" since investigation would already be complete.
The effort to admit lie detector results as scientific evidence
absent stipulation has been overwhelmingly unsuccessful. Should
the effort be successful57 in the future, however, lie detector results would be important evidence of a witness' credibility. In
that unlikely circumstance, a party might be able to show a need '
for the results in preparing his case that would outweigh workproduct protection. This determination would be made on a caseby-case basis."
(b) Application to admissions. -Unlike results, admissions
56. When the results clearly point to specific further investigation which is likely to
be fruitful, the need of the party may be adequately satisfied. If, for example, a bank teller
fails the lie detector test when he claims no surveillance cameras were operating during a
robbery, the defendant's attorney will make a special effort to find the films. The party
would have to know the result, however, to make the showing to begin with. Under Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), the prosecutor may be obligated, in effect, to make this
determination himself and disclose the results if they promise to have a sufficiently favorable effect on the defendant's case. See Section IV infra.
57. See note 166 infra. None of the jurisdictions recognizing a potentially adequate
foundation for results has ever reversed a conviction for failure to admit results. Since
these courts have, in practice, made lie detector results inadmissible, their position must
be viewed as functionally equivalent to one of actual inadmissibility in the application of
the work-product doctrine.
58. An opposing party may be entitled to work product even though the only anticipated value of the material is to impeach a particular witness. Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
59. The availability of alternative sources of information raises the spectre of the
witness being subjected to a second examination, sponsored by the opposing party. Assuming the willingness of the witness, the second test may not be as accurate as the first.
Given the accusatory nature of the examination, the reliability of multiple testing may
be low, and the dynamics of the first examination may be significant in assessing the
accuracy of the subsequent examination. Moreover, an examination of a hostile or unwilling witness is likely to engender emotions that interfere with accurate results.
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made during the course of an examination do play an evidentiary
role at trial, regardless of stipulation. Admissions are independently admissible to impeach the witness or to show his guilt.
Thus, in any given case, disclosure will turn on the ability of the
opponent to show materiality of the admissions and the difficulty
of obtaining equivalent information. This burden might be satisfied by demonstrating the probability that admissions suitable
for the purpose of impeachment have been made. The importance
of the material sought will depend upon the role of the witness
in the case and the availability of alternative sources of information. Each of these factors is difficult to predict at the time the
examination is being given. An alternative source of information
will often be unavailable in criminal cases because of the hostility
that may exist between parties and witnesses. Frequently, the
victim of a crime will talk only to the police and prosecution. In
the absence of any other opportunity for the opponent to interview a witness, admissions made to the operator may constitute
a unique source of impeachment. As compared with results, admissions are more susceptible to a showing of necessity and unavailability that overcomes the protection of the work-product
doctrine. Additionally, the protection available in most jurisdictions will be minimized by the absence of any role of the attorney's mental processes in the statements.
(c) The recording of admissions.-Underlying this discussion of the protection of witness admissions is a secondary question concerning the form of the admissions, i.e., whether they
have been written down. Some unrelated admissions may be explicitly incorporated into the modified control question. Otherwise, the operator's final report will generally contain no recitation of the subject's statements during the course of the examination. There is some indication that more may be preserved by the
operator than is contained in his report." In any event, failure to
record these statements may not foreclose the prospect of disclosure.
Although there is no case on point, a lie detector operator
presumably would be vulnerable to a grand jury subpoena. Some
60. As a rule, operators are encouraged to keep written records of the examination
other than their final report. "In view of the value of pretest interview responses and
behavior of the subject for test and overall diagnosis purposes, it is importantthat appropriate notes be taken by the examiner as he proceeds with the interview. It is unrealistic
to expect a reliance on memory alone." J. Rmd & F. INBAu, supra note 1, at 24 (emphasis
added, citation omitted).
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operators might "forget" the witness' statements, but others
would not." Since the nature of unrelated admissions is critical
to the process of interpreting the physiological responses, one
would expect many operators to be able to recall precisely what
those admissions were. Finally, jurisdictions that do not ordinarily provide for the reduction to writing of oral statements may
require transcription when the likelihood of use of those statements is so high that failure to record them is tantamount to the
suppression of evidence or the avoidance of discovery in bad
faith.6" Application of this reasoning to lie detector operators
would preclude the protection of admissions through the operator's failure to record.
(d) The shortcomings of the work-product doctrine.-The
subject's admissions will not be protected if an adequate showing
of materiality and unavailability is made. Materiality may be
shown on a case-by-case basis. Moreover, whatever protection the
doctrine does supply is subject to legislative change and the trend
has been toward increasing disclosure. Finally, to the extent that
the deficiencies of the work-product doctrine may be thought to
apply only to information written down, characteristics of the
examination process suggest that more is written down than the
operator reports and that reduction of witness admissions to writing would be relatively accurate.
At present, the only regular procedure for the admission of
lie detector results is by stipulation. Application of the workproduct doctrine to such stipulations is unnecessary because the
parties can draft stipulations to include or exclude underlying
61. Other professions, such as psychiatry, have been confronted with the temptation
to avoid legal difficulties in this fashion when asked for "confidential information."
Actually, where a psychiatrist is subpoenaed, the attorney does not await his
testimony or records with bated breath. The records, if any, are illegible and
cryptic; and many psychiatrists say that since records are rarely kept they could
destroy theirs without arousing suspicion. In lieu of records, if called as a witness, the psychiatrist is not apt to be a friendly one.

Slovenko, Psychotherapist-PatientTestimonial Privilege: A Misguided Hope, 23
U.L. REv. 649, 653 (1974).

CATH.

62. People v. Manley, 19 fll. App. 2d 365, 311 N.E.2d 593 (1974); State v. Burri, 87

Wash. 2d 175, 550 P.2d 507 (1976). In construing the Jencks Act, courts have recognized
the possibility of prejudice to the defendant from a bad faith failure to record or preserve

evidence. United States v. Head, 586 F.2d 508 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Terrell,
474 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1973). Accord, Corbin v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 465, 445 P.2d 441
(1968).
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statements if they desire. Under present law, the results are adequately protected by work product.
Work-product concepts are used by many courts in deciding
criminal discovery issues. 3 While some test results and statements during examinations may escape discovery under this doctrine, a substantial number will not. Lie detector examinations
are usually made in advance of trial, when it is impossible to
predict whether the opponent can make an adequate showing to
overcome work-product protection. The doctrine thus does not
provide sufficiently predictable protection for the attorney to assess the risk of an examination at the time he orders it or for the
operator to promise confidentiality when the test is given. To the
extent a prediction could be made, there would. still be a class of
cases that pose unacceptable tactical risks of subsequent disclosure for the use of the device. It is therefore appropriate to question the scope of protection that will be available for lie detector
examinations in the future; the need for a special privilege derives
in part from the ambiguous nature of the protection that is currently available.
C.

The Attorney-Client Privilege

The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage
the client to communicate fully with his attorney. 4 Statements
made in confidence by a client to his attorney cannot be disclosed
absent a waiver from the client. 5 The promise to the client that
63. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
64. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE § 87 (2d ed. 1972); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIMS AT COMMON LAW § 2291
(McNaughton rev. 1961). Although commentators have frequently asserted that the
attorney-client relationship should be protected as an instance of personal intimacy or
friendship, courts have not been responsive to changing the scope of the privilege. See
Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundationof the Lawyer Client Relation, 85
YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Gardner, A Reevaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 8 VIL.
L. REv. 279, 317 (1963); Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between
Lawyer and Client, 16 CAL. L. REv. 487, 489 (1928).
65. Wigmore's formulation is that the privilege exists
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought
(2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such,
(3) the communication relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence
(5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except the protection be waived.
8 J. WIOMORE, supra note 64, at § 2292. See also C. McCoRMICK, supra note 64, at §§ 87-
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nothing he says will be repeated by the attorney without permission encourages the client to be forthright. The privilege operates
to prevent both discovery and admission of relevant, reliable evidence, a quality to which courts have been hostile.8
The scope of the privilege represents a compromise between
the need for evidence and the need for free attorney-client communication. The compromise, however, must endeavor to take a
categorical rather than a case-by-case approach. Otherwise, an
attorney could not meaningfully assure his client that communications would be kept confidential. 7 A client hesitant to communicate because of fear of disclosure will not be reassured by the
statement that as long as other factors in his case develop along
certain lines, unknown at the time of the communication, his
confidence will be honored. The predictability of the attorneyclient privilege protection stands in contrast to the unpredictability of work product."
The attorney-client privilege is attractive to proponents of
the protection of lie detector information because of its absolute
nature. Once the requirements of the privilege are satisfied, protection is given regardless of the materiality of the information or
97. Many states have codified the privilege in their statutes. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 954
(West 1968); IOWA CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West Supp. 1979-80); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A: 84A-20
(West 1976).
66. "The purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosures to
their attorneys . . . . However, since the privilege has the effect of withholding relevant
information from the factfinder, it applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose."
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976). See Gardner, supra note 64. Concerning
the judicial unwillingness to allow privileges to withhold relevant evidence from the fact
finder, see note 148 infra. Also pertinent is the Supreme Court's response to the invocation
of executive privilege by former President Nixon regarding the "Watergate" tapes.
We have elected to employ an adversary system of criminal justice in which the
parties contest all issues before a court of law. The need to develop all relevant
facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends
of criminal justice would be defeated if judgment were to be founded on a partial
or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system
and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts,
within the framework of the rules of evidence.
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
67. A categorical approach has not been available for the psychotherapist-patient
privilege. See In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970), which
concerns a relationship requiring instant reassurance of privacy comparable to that of
attorney and client. The attorney-client privilege has been criticized for its evidentiary
cost, Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional
Entitlement, 91 HARv. L. REv. 464, 468-73 (1977), implicitly raising the possibility that
the attorney-client privilege is excessively tolerant of the working conditions of attorneys
because it is invented and perpetuated by attorneys themselves.
68. See notes 57-60 and accompanying text supra.
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its unavailability to the opponent. Satisfying the requirements,
however, is difficult. The privilege provides no protection at all
for those who are not clients. In criminal cases, only the defendant can be a client; no statements from prosecution witnesses
or from other defense witnesses would be covered. Reliance on the
attorney-client privilege for protection would automatically reduce the scope of lie detector subjects to defendants alone. Moreover, considerable ambiguity exists concerning the application of
the privilege to lie detector admissions, even from the defendant
himself, since these admissions are made to the lie detector operator rather than to the attorney. Virtually no precedent exists69
to extend the privilege to communications made to lie detector
operators and an analysis of precedent regarding communication
to other experts suggests that such an extension is doubtful.
Arguably, communications made to the lie detector operator
by the defendant should receive the same protection under the
privilege as statements made directly to the attorney. Statements7" made to the attorney ordinarily are privileged. The opera69. The Michigan Court of Appeals quite recently published its decision on this issue
in People v. Marcy, Mich. App. -,
283 N.W.2d 754 (1979) (released October 10,
1979), in which it construed Michigan legislation to privilege communications between a
lie detector operator and a subject that arose in an examination ordered by the subject's
attorney. Alternatively, the court held the attorney-client privilege applied to lie detector
operators in such settings. While the result reached by the court is contrary to the author's
e cpressed doubts, it does follow the uncritical trend of Michigan case law in this regard,
shown in People v. Hilliker, 29 Mich. App. 543, 185 N.W.2d 831 (1971) and Lindsay v.
Lipson, 367 Mich. 1, 116 N.W.2d 60 (1962). See text accompanying notes 88 through 92
infra. Notably, the court responded to a clear signal from the Michigan legislature to
protect, albeit somewhat broadly, lie detector information, see note 142 infra and accompanying text. This signal may explain the failure of the court to grapple seriously with
the distinction between investigators and experts regarding the attorney-client privilege,
or with the subsequent question of necessity for communication. See note 76 and text
accompanying notes 79-100 infra. Moreover, as can be gleaned from the statutes of other
states, see note 76 infra, a statute safeguarding the confidentiality of lie detector information may become tantamount to legislative expansion of the attorney-client privilege.
Notwithstanding the loss of reliable evidence, courts will of course accede to such legislative decisions of policy.
70. The substance and purpose of a statement can remove it from the protection of
the attorney-client privilege, even if it is made directly and privately to the attorney.
When the client's communication is made in furtherance of a crime or a tort, the privilege
does not apply. United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 909 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 911 (1976); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1085 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); C. McCoRNicK, supra note 64, at § 95; J. WIGMORE, supra
note 64, at §§ 2298, 2299. The limitation is particularly troublesome when the communication concerns some ongoing or future criminal activity. Whether the attorney ignores such
a communication, advises the client against the activity, intercedes anonymously on
behalf of the victims, or acts blatantly to prevent the activity depends upon an unresolved

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss3/9

34

503
PRIVILEGE
DETECTOR
LIE
Axelrod: The Need for an
Evidentiary
Privilege
for the Use of Lie Detector
1980]
tor is merely a surrogate for the attorney, who, if he had the
operator's special training and experience, would perform the lie
detector test himself. The admission made to the operator is
therefore, arguably, a communication made in confidence; it is a
privileged communication, and its substance should not be revealed, whether by subpoena, discovery or court order.
To understand the difficulty with this argument, various
limitations on the attorney-client privilege must be discussed.
Statements that are not made in confidence do not receive protection under the privilege. Confidentiality is at the heart of the
privilege; if there were no fear of disclosure on the part of the
client, no privilege would be necessary in the first place. Thus,
the presence of third persons generally precludes the operation of
the privilege. For example, in Bolyea v. First Presbyterian
Church of Wilton,71 the privilege was held not to apply to a discussion between a client and his attorney at which three of the
client's acquaintances also were present. The acquaintances had
simply accompanied the client for lunch and then proceeded
question of the attorney's obligation to his client, his ethics, and the public safety. See
Calan & David, ProfessionalResponsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality:Disclosure
of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RuT. L. RPv. 332, 334, 389-93 (1976);
Gardner, The Crime or FraudException to the Attorney-Client Privilege,47 A.B.A.J. 708,
710 (1961); Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1029 (1967). The answer may lie in the seriousness of the
crime and the certainty of its execution. The prospect of an attorney's indictment for
withholding such information may prompt voluntary disclosure, and thus the issue may
constitute more of a de facto limitation on the privilege than might ultimately be necessary as a matter of law. Such an indictment occurred but was dismissed in People v. Belge,
50 A.D.2d 1088, 376 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1976). The attorney withheld his client's communication of a recent murder. The certainty of future dismissals is severely questioned by
Justice Jason's dissent in that case. Unpublished opinions and documents in the case are
KEENAN, TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, MATERIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE, 235-300 (1979).

collected in P.

Lie detector operators are particularly susceptible to this problem because they are
more likely than attorneys to receive communications of ongoing and future criminal
activity, particularly if it is unrelated to the crime under investigation. The attorney has
no need for such communication and its ambiguous ethical ramifications. He may even
tacitly discourage the client from disclosing crimes unrelated to the instant accusation.
In any event, the client will usually not be anxious to reveal such information to his
attorney. The operator, however, must know the thoughts that produce anxiety. The
thought of a future or ongoing crime is just as important to the interpretation of physiological responses as the thought of a past crime. Any attempt to limit those disclosures
threatens the validity of the examination. The operator encourages the disclosures of these
crimes and induces the subject to cooperate. To the extent that the attorney-client privilege provides only weak protection for such disclosures, the privilege will be even more
deficient when such statements are made to the lie detector operator, rather than to the
attorney.
71. 196 N.W.2d 149 (N.D. 1972).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

35

SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW
South
Carolina
Law Review,
Vol.REVIEW
31, Iss. 3 [1980], Art..[Vol.
9

31

down the street with him in his search for an attorney. The court
held that
[t]he privilege of the attorney-client relationship is grounded
upon the necessity of providing for every client a freedom from
any apprehension in discussing the most personal matters with
his attorney, and to encourage the client freely to communicate
with his attorney without fear of disclosure. However, if the
client chooses to make or receive his communication in the presence of a third person, it ceases to be confidential and, therefore,
the client is not entitled to the protection afforded by the rule."
The lie detector operator is not the attorney, and communications made to third persons generally destroy the privilege. Lie
detector operators, however, might arguably be part of an exception to this strict view of confidentiality, along with other experts
who examine clients. While the case law concerning certain other
experts is well established, its extension to lie detector operators
is open to doubt.
An analysis of third-party exceptions to the confidentiality
requirement of the attorney-client privilege begins with interpreters. There is no controversy over the proposition that a defendant
who needs a foreign language interpreter to communicate with his
attorney can speak freely with the interpreter and that what is
said will be covered by the privilege as though the client were
speaking privately and dilrectly to the attorney himself." The
interpreter operates in a mechanical fashion. He merely provides
the client with the same degree of communication that a typical,
English-speaking client would have.
A more difficult application of the privilege arises when third
parties are present to provide emotional security so that the client
can be expansive with the attorney. Thus, wives, mothers, and
siblings arguably can be privy to attorney-client discussions without compromising the privilege. Courts have not agreed on the
impact of the presence of such third parties on the claim of privilege.7 McCormick's position,75 that a third party reasonably nec72. Id. at 153-54.
73. United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1963); C. MCCORMICK, supra note
64, at § 91; 8 J. WMORE, supra note 64, at §§ 2292, 2312-2321.
74. See cases cited in 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 64 at § 2311 n.6.
75. As to relatives and friends of the client, the results of the cases are not
consistent, but it seems that here not only might it be asked whether the client
reasonably understood the conference to be confidential, but also whether the
presence of the relative or friend was reasonably necessary for the protection of
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essary for the client's protection should not vitiate the privilege,
makes sense out of the factual situation, but does not accurately
predict the results in a given case. One reason for the failure of
courts to be completely responsive to this reasoning may be the
difficulty of preserving the rationale underlying the privilege. The
privilege is predicated on the need for confidentiality. Although
some confidential communications could occur in the presence of
third parties, many, like those in Bolyea, seem to fly in the face
of the notion that without secrecy the client would feel too embarrassed to speak. The sheer number of communications covered by
the privilege would be much higher if the presence of third parties
were not generally thought inconsistent with confidentiality. The
evidentiary cost of the privilege, however, would no longer be
tailored to its purpose.
Experts76 who interview the client on behalf of the attorney
the client's interests in the particular circumstances.
supra note 64, at § 91. See also 2 J. WEINSTEIN, EVIDENCE 503(a)(4)[01]
(1975). A similar approach is suggested by Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(a)(4),
which Congress did not enact. Sometimes the matter is resolved by conceptualizing the
third person as a "confidential agent" of the client, McCaffrey v. Estate of Brennan, 533
S.W.2d 264, 267-68 (Mo. 1976), or in terms of whether the substance of the communication
was regarded by the client as not confidential by virtue of subsequent repetition to others.
Solon v. Lichtenstein, 39 Cal. 2d 75, 79-80, 244 P.2d 907, 910 (1952); Workman v. Boylan
Buick, 36 A.D.2d 978, 979, 321 N.Y.S.2d 983, 986 (1971).
76. Most jurisdictions extend the attorney-client privilege to the personnel of the
attorney's office, including secretaries, law clerks, and investigators, regarding their communications with the client. E.g., State v. Tapia, 113 N.J. Super. 322, 273 A.2d 769 (App.
Div. 1971); Aldrich v. Catel Service Co., 51 Misc. 2d 16, 272 N.Y.S.2d 582 (1966); Dudek
v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis. 2d 559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967); Steele v. Stewart, 41 Eng. Rep.
711 (1844); Ross v. Gibbs, 8 L.R. 526 (1869); CAL. Evm. CODE § 954 (West 1968); IowA
CODE ANN. § 622.10 (West Supp. 1979-80); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 84A-20 (West 1976); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAw § 3101(b)-(d) (McKinney 1970); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 905.03 (West 1975).
Contra, San Diego Professional Ass'n v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 194, 373 P.2d 448, 23
Cal. Rptr. 384 (1962); Calahan v. Newsday, Inc., 228 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
Experts have been treated separately. See notes 87-96 and accompanying text infra.
Lie detector operators are more likely to be treated as investigators and hence extensions of the attorney, when legislation specifically designates them as such, rather than
as experts, see NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 648.011, -.012, -.200, -.210 (Repl. Pps. 1977), or if
subject-operator communications are declared to be "privileged," MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§ 338-1728 (1970). The Michigan law was recently so construed in People v. Marcy, Mich. App. -,
283 N.W.2d 754 (1979). See note 69 supra. Other existing legislation
indicates some protection of information given to lie detector operators, if characterized
as investigators, without explicitly indicating the ability of an investigator to resist questions before grand and petit juries. E.g., ME. Ray. STAT. tit. 32, §§ 6060, 6062.2.D (1964);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 326.336 (subd. 4) (Cum. Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-116,
62-2702(7) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
The rationale for different treatment of experts and investigators under the attorneyclient privilege is nowhere stated. The fact that today's criminal investigators possess
C. MCCORMICK,
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have characteristics of both the interpreter and the friend. The
privilege has been applied in this circumstance through the reasoning used for interpreters. There are, however, unique costs
attached to the application of the privilege to these experts. For
example, a psychiatrist does more than merely "interpret" the
language of psychopathology; the psychiatrist adds his own
knowledge and conclusions, and also makes his own observations.7" Consequently, the application of the attorney-client privilege to psychiatric interviews has the effect of insulating from
disclosure items that, by their nature, are not germane to the
special skill and expertise in matters such as photography tends to blur further an otherwise difficult distinction. Both experts and investigators are immersed in a particular
case, and possess information properly protected by the work-product doctrine. The distinction between expert and investigator has as its operational significance, for the
gttorney-client privilege, the necessity of communication from the client. One characterized as an investigator need not make that showing to partake of the privilege; an expert
must.
The following distinction is suggested. An expert should be treated differently than
an investigator because of the independence of the expert vis-A-vis the attorney. The
attorney makes only a few categorical demands of the expert, whose primary function is
to formulate an accurate opinion of some aspect of the case in terms of his special expertise. The investigator may be directed step-by-step by the attorney to locate a witness,
take certain pictures, or ask certain questions; the expert is asked to form an opinion about
a matter, such as the mental state of the defendant, and at that point, ceases to take
direction from the attorney. This distinction shows that the expert is not really a member
of the attorney's "team," and not really the attorney's representative to the client. Under
this definition, the lie detector operator is clearly an expert, and not entitled to treatment
as the extension of the attorney as an investigator would be, under the privilege.
Alternatively, one can view the exceptional treatment of investigators as third parties
under the privilege as part of the policy that such persons be necessary for client communication to the attorney, on the theory that under the system most attorneys use, an attorney
cannot physically make every client interview himself, or have every communication with
the client in the course of the case. Investigators, therefore, are usually in the regular
employ of the attorney. Investigators may be necessary to expand the number of communications that can be made to the attorney by the client; however, the use of experts has
a different function. Experts are not simply for communication, but for analysis of the
client. As long as the expert is not also necessary for communication, client communications should not be privileged; analysis of the client is not, by itself, the focus of the
attorney-client privilege. In any event, the unresolved nature of this issue lends doubt to
the usefulness of the attorney-client privilege to protect lie detector information, particularly when courts are generally unwilling to expand privileges. Since that unwillingness
is responsive to the loss of evidence, the prospect that justice can be done with a less costly
privilege makes expansion even less likely. The application of the attorney-client privilege
would seclude a greater quantum of information from courts (particularly confessions to
the matter under investigation) than would the evidentiary privilege proposed in Section
V infra.
77. Friedenthal, Discovery and Adverse Use of an Adverse Party's Expert
Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455, 464-66 (1962). The expert receives unwarranted protection from disclosure extending to his own opinions that are not communicative as well as
to his observation of the noncommunicative aspects of the client.
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policies of the privilege. In civil cases, this criticism is mitigated
by the likelihood of disclosure of statements given to the expert
by way of deposition."' In criminal cases, the decision to protect
an expert as an intermediary of communications poses a greater
evidentiary cost. Without an expert, only two sources of the
client's statement exist - the client and the attorney. Because
of the fifth amendment, the client cannot be deposed. The attorney cannot be compelled to disclose the client's statements because of the privilege. The decision to include the expert under
the privilege is therefore extremely significant. Not only may
statements made to the expert be protected, but those between
the expert and attorney may be protected as well. While the
substance of these communications may be disclosed in civil
cases, these alternatives are not available in criminal cases.
1. The Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Experts.-There is virtually no case law applying the attorneyclient privilege to lie detector examinations. Communications
made by a defendant to a psychiatrist in the course of an interview arranged at the request of the attorney, however, will be
protected by the privilege." The purpose of such an interview is
presumably to allow the attorney to better understand the prospect of a particular defense or legal maneuver concerning the
client's condition. In most cases, an expert consulted by the client
at the request of the attorney is, absent a subsequent waiver,
treated as an extension of the attorney and therefore the client
can talk as freely with that expert as he could with the attorney,
retaining his protection under the privilege.
The precedent of treating some experts as attorneys, for purposes of the privilege, is unlikely to be extended to lie detector
operators because of their unique role in criminal litigation.
Under the extant precedent, it is necessary to distinguish between
the need for an expert to assist in the preparation for trial and
the need for an expert to act as a conduit of communication from
the client to the attorney. The first need does not implicate the
policy of the attorney-client privilege.
The spirited gathering of evidence and the vigorous planning
of strategy are indeed worthy of encouragement, but not under
78. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30, 33, 36.
79. United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961); State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978); State v.
Kociotek, 23 N.J. 400, 129 A.2d 417 (1957).
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the rubric of the attorney-client privilege. The work-product doctrine is exactly suited for those purposes." More importantly, the
work-product doctrine affirmatively sets limits on the weight
these purposes should be accorded, balancing the necessity of
protection from disclosure against the materiality and unavailability of the evidence. To apply the attorney-client privilege to
this end is not only redundant, but also in direct conflict with the
policy of the work-product doctrine to preserve the availability of
an attorney's materials under the appropriate circumstances.
In Hickman v. Taylor,' the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the application of the attorney-client privilege for this reason.82 Had it thought otherwise, the Court would not have discussed the alternative availability of the material sought. The
lower court had addressed at great length the contrary proposition and held the privilege applicable." Prior to the enunciation
of the work-product doctrine, courts often had implemented work
product policies under the rubric of the attorney-client privilege,
at times candidly admitting that the privilege was not directly
pertinent." After Hickman, the need for another label to provide
work-product protection no longer existed. Proper application of
the attorney-client privilege to experts, therefore, depends upon
the necessity of the expert for attorney-client communications
and cannot rely solely on the work-product policy of encouraging
preparation for litigation.
80. See Section fII.B.
81. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
82. Id. at 508.
83. The reason for the frank extension of [the attorney-client] privilege beyond
testimonial exclusion rests on the same foundation that the rule of evidence
does. It is the same foundation upon which we base the immunity of the judge
for his official acts in that capacity. It is found again in the nonliability of the
judge, counsel and witnesses for defamation for what they say in the trial of a
lawsuit. In none of these instances is the immunity based on the convenience of
the individual judge, lawyer or client. It is, rather, a rule of public policy, and
the policy is to aid people who have lawsuits and prospective lawsuits. Those
members of the public who have matters to be settled through lawyers and
through litigation should be free to make full disclosure to their advisers, and
to have those advisers and other persons concernedin the litigationfree to put
their wholesouled efforts into the business while it is carried on.
Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F.2d 212, 223 (3d Cir. 1945) (emphasis added, citations omitted).
84. See In re Grand Jury Proceeding, 473 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1973). For a collection of
cases, see Annot., 139 A.L.R. 1250 (1942). The distinction between the two doctrines and
the judicial preference for work product as allowing more evidence and as being responsive
to the peculiarities of the individual case is set forth in Dudek v. Circuit Court, 34 Wis.
559, 150 N.W.2d 387 (1967).
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The distinction between these two different functions of an
expert has not been starkly presented previously because an expert who is needed for communication is almost invariably also
useful in the attorney's preparation for trial. Among those experts
who examine clients, only the lie detector operator performs the
preparation function without the communication function. The
precedent concerning experts has made reference to the preparation function, but has never found that function, by itself, a sufficient condition for the invocation of the attorney-client privilege.
The leading case on the extension of the attorney-client privilege to experts is City & County of San Francisco v. Superior
Court.85 James Hession sought to recover damages from the City
of San Francisco for an alleged injury to his nervous system. He
was examined by a doctor according to the wishes of his attorney.
The city sought a writ of mandamus in the California Supreme
Court to contest the trial court's ruling that the doctor's opinion,
which was based on the interview with the client, was protected
from discovery by the attorney-client privilege. Justice Traynor
found no physician-patient privilege applicable since the examination was not for the purpose of treatment and disclosure, therefore, would not deter other patients from being forthright with
their physicians when seeking treatment. Construing the statutory attorney-client privilege, Justice Traynor reviewed prior authority on the use of interpreters and messengers and concluded
that the section of the statute referring to clerks and secretaries
impliedly authorized the privilege for doctors as well:
[W]hen communication by a client to his attorney regarding his physical or mental condition requiresthe assistance of a
physician to interpret the client's condition to the attorney, the
client may submit to an examination by the physician without
fear that the latter will be compelled to reveal the information
disclosed ....

86

Justice Traynor's approach can be viewed as a pragmatic
realization that, in a modern world, an attorney must be able to
"communicate" with his client in a variety of languages, many
of which require expert training to adequately understand. It is
not enough, in an era of great advances in medicine, to simply
question the client on his impressions of the cause and conse85. 37 Cal. 2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951).
86. Id. at 237, 231 P.2d at 31 (emphasis added, citations omitted).
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quence of an injury. A meaningful account of a client's physical
condition can only be communicated through the application of
medical training the lawyer does not possess. The nature of the
confidential communications to be protected must keep pace
with the times if the attorney-client privilege is to continue to be
of social value. Nonetheless it is important to note the limitation
Justice Traynor placed upon the extension of the privilege: the
expert's assistance must be required for communication. City &
County of San Franciscoprotected the doctor's interview against
disclosure because to do otherwise would have handicapped the

client's ability to communicate effectively with his attorney.
Some of the information that the doctor might otherwise have
been required to reveal, including certain observations and opinions, was protected because it was inextricably intertwined with
the client's communications. The existence of this extra information does not diminish the necessity of the expert for communication between the client and his attorney.
The progeny of City & County of San Francisco has formulated additional reasons for extension of the attorney-client privilege to experts. A sensible result is reached by these opinions in
extending the privileges to particular experts, 7 but it does not

follow that the attorney-client privilege will apply to lie detector
operators or that this reasoning is sufficient to support the privilege.
This trend is illustrated by a comparison of two Michigan
cases, Lindsay v. Lipson" and People v. Hilliker.9 In Lindsay, the
87. Weinstein construes Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(a)(3), which provides
that "[a] representative of the lawyer is one employed to assist the lawyer in the rendition
of professional legal services," as representing an extension of the clerk or secretary conduit function to any expert retained for litigation. The expert who interviews the client
at the behest of the attorney is the attorney's agent and hence the attorney-client privilege
protects communication from client to expert and from expert to attorney. 2 J. WEINSTEN,
supra note 75, at 503(a)(3)[01]. No cases are cited that directly consider this proposition nor is the matter of necessity for communication discussed as central to the rule.
Weinstein does note, however, that the existence of other federal limitations on access to
expert's information renders the applicability of the attorney-client privilege "somewhat
academic." Id. The majority of the case law has emphasized the requirement of necessity.
See United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1963), and cases cited in note 79 supra.
Courts have at times deemed the expert so essential to the theory of the case, as, for
example, a scientist in patent litigation, that they treat the expert as co-counsel for
reasons that are admittedly beyond those of the attorney-client privilege. Compare Lalance & Grossjean Mfg. Co. v. Haberman Mfg. Co., 87 F. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1898) with United
States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975) and State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d
590 (1978).
88. 367 Mich. 1, 116 N.W.2d 60 (1962).
89. 29 Mich. App. 543, 185 N.W.2d 831 (1971).
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Michigan Supreme Court held privileged the testimony of a doctor who was hired specifically for litigation and who examined the
plaintiff:
Had Mrs. Lindsay possessed the requisite training and skill to
make an accurate appraisal of her physical condition and to
draw reasonable conclusions therefrom as to probable future
developments, any communication by her to her attorney of
such appraisal and diagnosis would without question have been
privileged and she could not have been examined as a witness
with reference thereto. To accomplish the desired result the
attorney'representing her deemed it necessary to employ a medical expert to act for him and his client and to convey to him
on behalf of his client the information he needed to properly
prepare his pleading and to try the cases that the party intended
to institute."
The significance of the doctor as a necessary link in communication is clear. Because the patient lacked the doctor's expert training, the attorney needed the doctor to comprehend medical information given by the client. In construing Lindsay, however,
Hilliker changed the emphasis in the reasoning behind the privilege. The defendant in Hilliker complained that at trial the prosecutor elicited testimony from a psychiatrist who had initially
examined Hilliker at the request of the defense attorney; the
psychiatrist's report was highly unfavorable and the defense
elected not to call him to the stand. The appellate court held this
testimony to have violated the attorney-client privilege.
[S]ince the privilege clearly extends to confidential communications made directly by the client to the attorney, there is
nothing to dictate a different result where the communication
is made to the attorney by an agent on behalf of the client, such
as a doctor or a psychiatrist. In these complex times, the
attorney-client privilege would be greatly eroded unless the
client is allowed to communicate through an expert whose services are needed to prepare for trial.'
No emphasis was placed on the necessity of the expert for communication, although Lindsay was cited. Instead, the court ignored necessity for communication and turned to the usefulness
of the expert in preparing the case as the metjor rationale for the
90. 367 Mich. at 5, 6, 116 N.W.2d at 63 (emphasis added).
91. 29 Mich. App. at 547, 185 N.W.2d at 833.
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extension of the privilege. No distinction is made between the
convenience or usefulness of having the psychiatrist as a conduit
of information, and the necessity of having him as a conduit.
Although the court in Hilliker might have done more to underscore the communications aspect of the Lindsay case, the result
reached is nonetheless consistent with Lindsay. Perhaps the court
was overly indulgent in framing the rationale of the privilege
because it seemed unfair for the prosecution to take advantage of
the defense investigation. To the extent the court sought to discourage the prosecutor from engaging in tactics that would deter
the defense from developing its case, the court's concern embodied the policies underlying the work-product doctrine. Using the
attorney-client privilege, however, with its more absolute protection of relevant evidence, is contrary to the work-product policy
of allowing disclosure upon an adequate showing. An expansion
of the attorney-client privilege without reliance on facilitation of
communication was, therefore, inappropriate.
A similar trend is evident in United States v. Alvarez.2 In
Alvarez an attorney sought successfully to have a psychiatrist
appointed at court expense to determine the competency of defendant, who was charged with kidnapping and related conspiracy charges. Through the reciprocal nature of discovery in federal
criminal cases,93 the government received a copy of the report of
this psychiatrist. The report indicated an opinion that defendant
was sane at the time of the offense and made reference to statements made by defendant during the course of the psychiatric
examination. Over defendant's objection, the psychiatrist testified for the government, using the statements made in the psychiatric examination as part of his testimony. As one of several94
92. 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975).
93. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); FED. R. CsuM. P. 12.2, 16.
94. "The effective assistance of counsel with respect to the preparation of an insanity
defense demands recognition that a defendant be as free to communicate with a psychiatric expert as with the attorney he is assisting. If the expert is later used as a witness. ..
the cloak of privilege ends." 519 F.2d at 1046. Obviously, the court is also concerned with
the question of effective assistance of counsel; the sixth amendment issue requires separate analysis beyond the scope of this article. The court, however, frames this policy as
part of the attorney-client privilege. The need for a psychiatrist as a conduit of communication would have by itself resolved the case with precisely the same result. See State v.
Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590 (1978). Also cited in Alvarez was United States v. Kovel,
296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1963). Kovel concerned the use of an accountant, but it was framed
in terms of the necessity for communication:
Accounting concepts are a foreign language to some lawyers in almost all cases,
and to almost all lawyers in some cases. Hence the presence of an accountant
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bases for its reversal, the Third Circuit cited City & County of
San Francisco for the proposition that an attorney should not
have to risk the creation of an adverse witness in the process of
fully considering the insanity defense. This policy, though sound,
does not flow directly from City & County of San Francisco. An
approach that preserves the necessity-of-communications aspect
of the attorney-client privilege still requires the conclusion
reached in Alvarez because, notwithstanding the risk of creating
an adverse witness, a psychiatrist is necessary for communication
to the attorney from the client.
A more appropriate response to the fear that defense investigation will be deterred by the adverse use of experts previously
consulted is found in Pouncy v. State."5 The prosecution successfully deposed defendant's psychiatrist. Although the court made
reference to the attorney-client privilege in its reversal of the
conviction, its analysis reveals that it actually applied the workproduct doctrine. The court considered significant the previous
consultation of the psychiatrist as part of the attorney's preparation for an insanity defense. It determined that there was no
dearth of experts available to the state, even though this particular psychiatrist was now unavailable. It also determined that the
unavailability of this defense expert to the prosecution did not so
encumber the prosecution that the public interest in a wellinformed trier of fact was undermined.96 These limitations on
privilege make the action of the Florida court in Pouncy analytically similar to an application of the work-product doctrine,
rather than the attorney-client privilege. The protection offered
was concerned with the materiality of the information and the
accessibility of alternative sources, both of which are irrelevant
to the attorney-client privilege.
.. . while the client is relating a complicated tax story to the lawyer, ought not
to destroy the privilege any more than would that of the linguist. . . . [Tihe
presence of the accountant is necessary, or at least highly useful, for the effective
consultation between the client and the lawyer which the privilege is designed
to permit.
296 F.2d at 922.
95. 353 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 1977).
96. Concern was raised, although not, according to the appellate court, supported by
the record, that the defense psychiatrist might have had the only meaningful opportunity
to perform a psychiatric interview to determine insanity at the time of the offense, because
of the difficulty of making such a determination through an interview after a substantial
amount of time has elapsed. The defendant's memory may be faulty; his symptoms may
change. In this case, the defense psychiatrist obtained an interview almost immediately
after the offense, but no showing of any difficulty for the state's psychiatrists was made.
Id. at 642.
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Pouncy also presents a certain irony. Although its discussion
of the expert's role in preparation for litigation is more consistent
with the work-product doctrine than the attorney-client privilege,
it ignores the role of the psychiatrist as a necessity for communication. Conditioning the confidentiality of a psychiatric interview
on the vagaries Pouncy considered reduces the predictability of
protection other courts have established for those interviews.
2. The Application of Attorney-Client Privilege to Lie
Detectors.-What Hilliker, Lindsay, City & County of San Francisco, Alvarez, and Pouncy show is that application of the
attorney-client privilege to experts makes sense only to the extent
that the expert is necessary for communication. They also display
the courts' concern that, if one party can freely use the evidence
and information gathered by the other, the full investigation of a
case may pose unacceptable risks to the attorney. Additionally,
the extension of the privilege to experts has been commended as
aiding the attorney in the best preparation of his case. None of
these additional concerns has changed the result of a single case;
every expert protected has also been necessary for communication. Therefore, although these cases might superficially appear
to support a general rule for experts that will apply to lie detector
operators, they should not be construed as dispensing with the
necessity-of-communication requirement. Since the other concerns are protected by other doctrines,9" it would be anomalous if
an expert unnecessary for communication was protected by the
attorney-client privilege.
The difficulty of characterizing the lie detector as a necessary
conduit of communication to the attorney centers around the
characterization of the subject matter being communicated. The
privilege has been construed to protect information communicated through experts when the experts were necessary for that
task. With the lie detector expert, the information can be characterized in two ways. Either it is the physiological concomitant of
truth and deception or it is simply the "yes" or "no" answer to
the relevant question posed by the operator to the subject. If it is
assumed that the privilege focuses on the first characterization,
the operator's conclusion concerning the meaning of the physiological responses appears to be within the privilege."8 His exper97. See notes 38-49 and accompanying text supra.
98. This view apparently is accepted by Reid and Inbau. J. REID & F. INBAU, supra
note 1, at 347-48.
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tise clearly is necessary for the physiological responses to have
any communicative value at all for the attorney. Statements
made in furtherance of that necessity, for example, admissions of
unrelated crimes, would be protected as inseparable from the
communications themselves and necessary to their interpretation
by the expert. Under the contrary view, however, the client is able
to bypass the operator's expertise and communicate the truth
directly to the attorney, thus obviating any necessity for the operator.
A third party who acts as a conduit for a communication is
not necessarily essential to the communication. The determination of necessity depends on the differences between the thirdparty communication and the communication that the client
himself could make directly to the attorney. A comparison of the
two views shows the operator should not be deemed necessary.
One difference between communication of the expert's opinion
and the client's forthright statement is the ability of the attorney
to convince others outside the attorney-client relationship of the
client's veracity. That difference is clearly irrelevant to the policy
behind the privilege. Other differences concerning the attorney's
belief of what the client says or the attorney's ability to extract
information from an unwilling client are similarly outside the
realm of the policies of the privilege. In short, since there is no
advantage in terms of the rationale underlying the privilege for
one communication over the other, an equivalent means of communication through an expert cannot be the focus of any necessity to communicate under the privilege.
The purpose of a lie detector examination is to determine
whether the subject is truthful. As far as the physiological responses are concerned an expert is necesshry to convey them meaningfully to the attorney. Those readings, however, are not the proper
focus of necessity. What the client could himself tell the attorney
does not gain necessity because it comes through an alternative
form. An English-speaking client who also speaks Spanish with
the same facility as English would have less of a claim to the use
of a Spanish interpreter than would a client who spoke only Spanish. The expert may render a valuable service by supplying an
alternative means of communication by which the attorney can
verify statements made directly to him by the client; nonetheless,
that value is not part of any of the policies providing protection
against disclosure. Similarly, the fact that additional evidence or
expert opinion useful in plea bargaining may be gathered is not
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part of the policies of this privilege.
Assuming the latter view of what is communicated through
the operator, the difficulty of applying the privilege to lie detector
operators is apparent. Nothing prevents the client from telling
the truth to his attorney; no special expertise is required either
by the client or his attorney. Indeed, the attorney-client privilege
was meant to relieve the client's fear of disclosure, not to preclude
the client's conscious, voluntary decision to consult with the lawyer as he sees fit. To the extent that the attorney does not trust
the client, the policy of the privilege is inapplicable, since it is
centered upon the client's willingness to make a confidential disclosure rather than the lawyer's need to verify it. It bears repeating that this distinction is important because, although other
protection is available for this material, it is not as categorical or
absolute as the protection provided by the attorney-client privilege.
It is also important to bear in mind here the distinction between the facilitation of communication and the development of
evidence useful at trial. Both the psychiatrist and the lie detector
operator may be useful to produce admissible expert evidence.
That kind of utility, however, is irrelevant to the inquiry posed
by the attorney-client privilege. The psychiatrist communicates
to the attorney information that the client would convey if he had
the perception and expertise to do so. The lie detector operator,
on the other hand, is not necessary in any interpretive capacity
for the client to communicate truthfully with his attorney.
Even if the operator is not deemed necessary for the client's
communication with the attorney, the operator might be thought
to fall within the ambit of the privilege because he facilitates
communication, as would a relative or friend present at the
attorney-client interview. Of course, the attorney is not present
in the lie detector examination." The operator might still be
thought of as functionally comparable to a friend or relative. This
characterization, however, is questionable. A typical client must
be presumed able to communicate with his attorney if he so
wishes. Who, then, is being aided by the examination? It is not
the client, but rather the attorney who seeks to verify what the
client has told him. In that instance, the examination does not
foster the relationship of trust and confidentiality between an
99. His presence would constitute a distraction and invalidate the examination.
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attorney and his client that the privilege contemplates. Indeed,
if the client is truthful, the examination is merely a search for
useful results. If the client is not truthful, it is a means to overcome a decision by the client to withhold information from his
attorney.' ® In that circumstance the examination would give rise
to a deceptive response or an admission in the course of the examination. If the client ultimately told the attorney what he told the
operator, or if upon being confronted with deceptive results he
confessed to the attorney, the examination could not be said to
have given him the emotional security to confess. Assisting the
attorney in extracting information from the client is substantially
different from allowing the client to communicate what he actually wishes to disclose to the attorney. The former function is
not the purpose of the privilege. Thus, regardless of the client's
truthfulness, the examination does not further the purpose of the
attorney-client privilege.
Statements made by the defendant during the examination
present a more complicated question. Although the defendant
could easily communicate such statements to the attorney without the expert and that communication presumably would be
protected if made directly, these statements develop only as artifacts of the quest for the operator's opinion of the defendant's
veracity. Moreover, it is material that the client would in many
instances neither want to nor need to divulge these to the attorney. Suppose the client is charged with the crime of assault with
a deadly weapon and he reveals to the operator a similar assault
he has committed. This other assault, factually unrelated to the
present charge, has as its only role in the examination the prospect that it will create a physiologically manifest concern for
which the operator must be able to account. This problem suggests as strong an argument for the protection of the information
as it does for the independence of that protection from the
attorney-client privilege. As the artifact of the quest of something
not itself protected, the artifact cannot receive protection under
the attorney-client privilege. The revelation of other crimes, for
100. Attorneys may occasionally use the lie detector to induce confessions by their

clients for their "own good," to facilitate guilty pleas, or even to disguise the attorney's
shortcomings in solving the client's legal problems. The extension of the attorney-client

privilege to third-party experts focuses on the client's ability to communicate, but not his
willingness. Indeed, to the extent free communication with the attorney is desired, the lie

detector examination is inapposite.
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example, is not withheld from the attorney for fear of disclosure,
nor is it necessary for communication of truthfulness regarding
the substance of the lie detector examination. It is necessary for
the accuracy of the test, but the test is not necessary to communicate the truth. For the purpose of communication, the examination itself and all of its artifacts are unnecessary and unprivileged. On the other hand, if the operator is perceived as necessary
for communication, these incidents will be privileged as part of
the ensuing protection for they would be necessary to interpret
the responses.
The attorney-client privilege cannot be relied upon to shield
the operator from inquiry concerning the results of the examination or the statements made during examination. To the extent
existing case law supports such an application, it represents an
unjustified extension of the policies underlying the attorneyclient privilege. Nonetheless, the extension has not been criticized because this case law, narrowly viewed, yields outcomes
consistent with those from the traditional application of the privilege. Given the policies of the attorney-client privilege, the lie
detector examination should not be characterized as necessary for
attorney-client communication. The high evidentiary cost that a
categorical privilege such as the attorney-client privilege exacts
on the quest for truth central to the trial of a criminal case indicates that courts will be critical of any expansion of the privilege.
While this criticism may not guarantee any particular result in a
given case, it underscores the need to look for other sources of
protection.
The purpose of this discussion has not been to prompt disclosure of lie detector information. Rather, its purpose has been to
recognize that the attorney-client privilege is ill-suited to the
protection of that information. The subject of the examination
may be a witness rather than a client and thus be unable to avail
himself of the privilege. The cases that have extended the privilege to other experts are unlikely to apply to the lie detector
operator. Finally, the existing precedent does not present the
kind of reliable confidentiality necessary for accurate lie detector
results and the kind of safety desired by attorneys who wish to
use the lie detector.
D.

The Application of the Fifth Amendment

The fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-
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incrimination affords no meaningful protection for the confessions, unrelated admissions, or results of lie detector examinations. The amendment focuses on the extent to which the government can extract evidence from the defendant. In general, only
testimonial evidence"' that is directly compelled from the defendant is covered.' ° Since the privilege is personal to the defendant,
101. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966).
102. The fifth amendment also poses a broader question than whether the defendant
has been compelled to produce testimonial evidence. The amendment is concerned with
the balance between the government and the individual in the prosecution of a criminal
case. See id. at 762. That concern, however, has not led courts to suppress evidence
compelled from the defense, regardless of its testimonial character, or relationship to the
defendant, as long as the defendant himself was not compelled to give testimonial evidence. Forcing the defendant to model clothing for the victim of a crime, Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 345 (1911), to furnish voice exemplars, United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S.
1 (1973), or to supply his blood for an intoxication test, Schmerber, has been held consistent with the amendment's protection, even though the defendant supplies crucial evidence that is used to incriminate him. A minority of the Court has attempted to afford
protection in this circumstance. E.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 31 (Douglas,
J., dissenting); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 243-46 (1967) (Black, J., concurring
and dissenting); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 773 (Black, J., dissenting). The
position taken in these opinions is that the defendant cannot be forced to help the prosecutor in any way, testimonial or otherwise, because of the balance of resources and the
burden of proof that rest with the prosecutor. A few state courts have been more solicitous
of the question of balance. In California, the defendant cannot be forced to supply the
prosecutor with anything that tends to incriminate him. Craig v. Superior Court, 54 Cal.
App. 3d 416, 126 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1976). Cf. State v. Scott, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974);
Keller v. Criminal Court, 262 Ind. 420, 430, 317 N.E.2d 433, 439 (1974) (DeBruler, J.,
concurring and dissenting); Blaisdell v. Commonwealth, 372 Mass. -,
364 N.E.2d 191
(1977). But cf. State v. Hardin, 558 S.W.2d 804 (Mo. App. 1977) (attorney's interview with
witness not protected by fifth amendment).
In United States v. Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974), the Ninth Circuit presented
a strong argument, marshalling federal precedent, that the fifth amendment protected
evidence gathered by the defendant, at least insofar as the evidence concerned the state's
prima facie case. The Supreme Court rejected the approach, however, when it reversed
Brown, sub nom. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). The resolution of this
argument suggests that the Supreme Court will not be receptive to alternative boundaries
on the state's ability to build a prima facie case using evidence developed by the defense,
even though the defense does not intend to introduce that evidence. Some lower courts
have set these boundaries as a means of guaranteeing adequate investigation and effective
representation for the defendant. The policy implicated is similar to that underlying the
protection of work product: to avoid deterring the defendant from developing his case or
exercising other constitutional rights. Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978);
United Statescv. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Theriault, 440
F.2d 713, 716-17 (5th Cir. 1971) (Wisdom, J., concurring), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 984
(1973); Collins v. Auger, 428 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Iowa 1977); State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576,
392 A.2d 590 (1978). Cf. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (improper to burden
decision to testify with requirement that defendant testify before his other witnesses);
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (improper to burden fourth amendment
rights with waiver of right to remain silent).
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it offers no protection for prosecution witnesses. Moreover, as long
as the defendant is not compelled to take the examination, the
privilege is not available to him either.
1. The Compulsion is Not Directed to the Defendant as a
Person.-What the defendant says in the course of an examination constitutes a statement like any other and is clearly testimonial in character. The interpretation of the physiological tracings
given in response to questions from the examiner is arguably
testimonial as well."'3 Once the defendant has willingly taken a
lie detector examination, however, this information, which could
not have been compelled directly from him, can be obtained from
the person who now possesses it, the lie detector operator. The
compulsion to produce testimonial information thus no longer
would be placed on the defendant,' 4 but rather on the operator.
In Mingo the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that allowing the testimony of the
defendant's handwriting expert to be used by the prosecution made defense investigation
so risky it would interfere with effective assistance of counsel. Although the court found
the error harmless, it is not clear from the opinion what role the crucial nature of the
handwriting evidence in the case played in the court's analysis. The defendant was
charged with rape. The victim claimed she was lost and initially approached the assaillant
for directions. She gave the police the handwritten directions she received. The policy of
the court to "safeguard the internal strategic process of the defense," 77 N.J. at 587, 392
A.2d at 595, is an amalgam of the work-product doctrine and the right to effective assistance of counsel under New Jersey and federal law.
103. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
104. A number of recent Supreme Court cases has decisively settled this issue. In
Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973), the Court held that a taxpayer could not
invoke the fifth amendment to avoid a subpoena directed at her own records, which were
in the custody of her accountant, because the compulsion of the subpoena operated on
the accountant and not the taxpayer. Id. at 329, 336. Similarly, in Fisher v. United States,
425 U.S. 391 (1976), a taxpayer was held unable to invoke the fifth amendment for records
held by his attorney because the compulsion to disclose rested on the attorney himself.
Id. at 399.
Fisher also cast a dim light on the notion expressed in Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616 (1886), that the fifth amendment, having as one of its policies the protection of
privacy, should be useful to protect private papers. The matter is of interest to lie detector
subjects since a close, personal, private exchange may be said to take place. See note 167
and accompanying text infra. Without explicitly holding that private, testimonial documents are not protected by the fifth amendment by virtue of their substance, the Court
implied that the substance would bring no special consideration under the fifth amendment:
Insofar as private information not obtained through compelled selfincriminating testimony is legally protected, its protection stems from other
sources-the Fourth Amendment's protection against searches without warrant
or probable cause and against subpoenas which suffer from "too much indefiniteness or breadth in the things required to be 'particularly described'" . ..
the First Amendment . . . or evidentiary privileges such as the attorney-client
privilege.
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Without the ingredient of direct compulsion," 5 the defendant's
fifth amendment claim would fail. If some other evidentiary privilege, such as the attorney-client privilege, were available for the
operator, the information might be protected.'"'
2. The Admissibility of Results and the Waiver of Privilege
Concerning Remaining Information.-If the law were to change
and admit unstipulated lie detector results as evidence of credibility, a defendant who passed the examination, but who had
made incriminating unrelated admissions, would want to proffer
the results but not the admissions. The prosecution would seek
to cross-examine the operator on a variety of subjects, including
the withheld information. Whatever privilege under the fifth
amendment-the defendant had would be waived, at least to the
extent necessary to afford adequate cross-examination. 7 Thus,
the fifth amendment would not operate to shield the admissions
once the results were admitted.
3. The Inadequacy of the Fifth Amendment.-Because
subjects take lie detector examinations willingly, the fifth
amendment has little impact on the disclosure of what is learned.
425 U.S. at 401 (footnotes and citations omitted). See id. at 428-30 (Brennan, J., concurring); State v. Grove, 65 Wash. 2d 525, 398 P.2d 170 (1965) (denying fifth amendment
protection to a letter written from a jailed husband to his wife).
105. Under most circumstances, when the defense is compelled to produce certain
information pursuant to subpoena or discovery rules, no direct compulsion is thought to
act on the defendant. The defendant's answer to these orders reveals not only the substance of the material sought, but the acknowledgment that the material exists. Ordinarily, that acknowledgment is of no significance, since the nature of the material is previously known by the prosecution. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410-12 (1976). A
number of courts have indicated, however, that requiring the defendant to acknowledge
the existence and nature of scientific tests that the defendant does not intend to introduce
in evidence is in effect a compulsion of testimonial material barred by the fifth amendment. People ex rel. Bowman v. Woodward, 63 Ill. 2d 382, 349 N.E.2d 57 (1976); see People
v. District Court, 187 Colo. 333, 531 P.2d 626 (1975). Since lie detector examinations must
often be advertised to be effective, whether to obtain favorable plea bargains, lower bail,
or cooperation from family members, this reasoning will often be inadequate to protect
the defendant's lie detector information.
106. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1975), the Court indicated that evidence possessed by the defense attorney was not protected by the fifth amendment, even
if it would have been protected in the defendant's hands. Id. at 409. The need to encourage
full attorney-client communication, however, requires that the defendant not be penalized
for talking to his attorneys. Thus, material for which the defendant could claim fifth
amendment protection does not lose its protection if it is communicated to the attorney
within the attorney-client privilege. The effect of this ruling is that the client incurs no
incremental risk of disclosure by communicating with his attorney.
107. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 64, at § 31. Concerning the necessity of some disclosures for adequate cross-examination, see notes 15-19 and accompanying text supra.
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If lie detector results ever become admissible absent stipulation,
the defendant may argue that protection of lie detector information is part of his right to an adequate investigation. An attempt
to use the results at trial, however, would waive even that protection of statements made in the course of the examination. At
present, there is no fifth amendment protection at all.
IV.

THE ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR'S DUTY TO DISCLOSE EVIDENCE
FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENSE

I

The prior section was concerned with the extent of protection
of lie detector information offered by the work-product doctrine,
the attorney-client privilege, and the fifth amendment. Protection is necessary for the use and usefulness of lie detectors, and
these devices are inadequate to guarantee this protection; therefore, a separate privilege is needed. Before considering that privilege, however, another inquiry must be made. The protection of
lie detector information by a judicially or legislatively created
privilege is meaningful only to the extent that privilege is not
contrary to the Constitution. Whenever the Constitution would
require disclosure of lie detector information, a privilege without
a constitutional basis cannot be invoked to prevent disclosure.
This section is concerned with situations in which constitutionally mandated disclosure would contravene any claim of privilege. As will be seen, the frequency of such a conflict is sufficiently small that consideration of a new privilege is meaningful.
Constitutionally Compelled Disclosure by the Prosecution
The defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial imposes a
duty on the prosecution to disclose certain evidence favorable to
the defense. To the extent that lie detector information from the
examination of prosecution witnesses must be disclosed under
this doctrine, a privilege could not be claimed by the prosecution
and it would therefore be discouraged from testing its witnesses.
A consideration of the doctrine and its application to results, unrelated admissions, and confessions shows that the duty to disclose favorable evidence will have little practical impact on the
functioning of a lie detector privilege.
Information that the prosecution is obligated to disclose is
generally referred to as Brady material, after the case of Brady
A.
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v. Maryland.0 In Brady, defendant was held to have been denied
his right to a fair trial when the prosecutor failed to disclose a
confession by a codefendant that corroborated defendant's claim
that the codefendant was primarily responsible for the victim's
death. Because of the nondisclosure, defendant was prejudiced
when sentenced.
Brady and the cases that have followed it stand for the principle that the prosecutor's constitutional role in the criminal justice system is more than that of a mere advocate.' The prosecutor has a responsibility to make the trial into a vehicle for truth;
therefore, he should not withhold evidence that would tend to
exculpate the defendant. 110 When the prosecutor or persdns
closely associated with the prosecution possess favorable evidence, it should be disclosed. Failure to do so,"' however, actually
108. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
109. The classic statement of this position is found in Berger v. United States, 295
U.S. 78 (1935), in which the prosecutor's behavior at trial was so egregious that it
prompted a new trial. The prosecutor obtained a conviction through misstatement, innuendos, and badgering. The Court stated:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a
criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.
As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed he should do so. But, while he
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Id. at 88.
110. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 80910 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972); Miller
v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967). This proposition did not originate with Brady. See Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
111. The Brady doctrine is meant to redress wrongful withholding of evidence. As a
practical matter, the defendant must discover, before or after trial, that the prosecutor
indeed has favorable evidence; if it is forever kept secret, intentionally or not, the prosecutor's error cannot be reviewed. The withholding would still be a constitutional violation.
This factor is equally applicable to the work-product doctrine or to any aspect of discovery. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text supra.
The fact that Brady material is not written down does not alter its character. For
example, when it becomes known after conviction that the police withheld pretrial knowledge of an alternative suspect, the reduction of the knowledge to writing plays no factor
in the analysis. Cannon v. Alabama, 558 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1977); Lee v. United States,
388 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1968); Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. App. 1978). Cf. United
States v. Wolfson, 322 F. Supp. 798 (D. Del. 1971), aff'd, 454 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 924 (1972); Wagner v. United States, 418 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 1969).
The Brady obligation is consistent with an obligation to preserve favorable informa-
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(1978), defendant was taken to jail covered with blood and bruises. He had been arrested
for murder and his attorney sought to photograph him to preserve corroboration of his
statement that he himself had been mugged, probably by the real murderers. The superintendent of the jail refused permission, and McDonald was subsequently convicted of
murder. After spending three years in prison, McDonald was vindicated. The real murderer confessed, and McDonald was freed. He promptly sued, inter alia, the jail superintendent. In refusing to dismiss the civil rights claim, which was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976), the Seventh Circuit commented:
A defendant's right to prepare the best defense he can and to bring to the court's
attention any evidence helpful to this case is constitutionally protected. The
Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 101 L. Ed.
2d 215 (1963) recognized the right of a defendant to have access to exculpatory
evidence in the hands of the prosecutor. We believe a defendant also has the
right to preserve possibly exculpatory evidence and to the extent the government or its agent frustrate such preservation, the defendant has a constitutional
claim.
557 F.2d at 603.
A similar issue arises when the prosecution or its agents destroy, rather than merely
fail to preserve, otherwise discoverable evidence. Even when material is destroyed in the
course of routinely transferring it to another form, as from rough notes to a neat report,
the prospect of favorable evidence remains. For example, in United States v. Harrison,
524 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the court disapproved of the destruction of rough notes of
an F.B.I. interview of an eyewitness to an alleged bank robbery. Although the interview
was routinely reported elsewhere,
[I]t seems too plain for argument that rough notes from any witness interview
could prove to be Brady material. Whether or not the prosecution uses the
witness at trial, the notes could contain substantive information or leads which
would be of use to the defendants on the merits of the case.
Id. at 427. One of the elements in assessing the appropriate sanction for the erroneous
failure to preserve evidence is the bad faith of the police. See note 118 infra. As the court
in Harrisonnotes, such an appraisal is quite difficult without knowing the substance of
what could have been preserved. 524 F.2d at 432. Although the issue of preservation has
not been strictly tied to the Brady obligation to disclose, the two naturally arise when
evidence that could have been favorable is destroyed or not preserved. See United States
v. Vella, 562 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1074 (1978); United States v.
Harris, 543 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Terrell, 474 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1973).
These courts found that a routine practice of destruction and reliance on other sources
does not necessarily excuse the failure to preserve Brady material. See Augenblick v.
United States, 393 U.S. 348 (1969); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(destruction of a contemporaneous tape recording of an alleged narcotics sale held to
contravene Brady); see also United States v. Wolfson, 322 F. Supp. 798 (D. Del. 1971)
(opportunity for defendant to interview witness "suppressed' by the prosecution mitigates
Brady prejudice). When physical evidence is involved, courts are more willing to speculate
on the helpfulness of the evidence to the defendant, in addition to the question of bad
faith. See United States v. Sewar, 468 F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 1026
(1973); United States v. Consolidated Laundries, 291 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1961); United
States v. Heath, 147 F. Supp. 877 (D. Hawaii 1957), appeal dismissed, 260 F.2d 623 (9th
Cir. 1958); People v. Eddington, 53 Mich. App. 200, 218 N.W.2d 831 (1974) (good
faith/unintentional loss of glass particle excused); State v. Graig, 169 Mont. 150, 545 P.2d
649 (1976) (no bad faith in loss of portions of nightgown in rape case and therefore police
technician could testify); State v. Canaday, 90 Wash. 2d 808, 585 P.2d 1185 (1978) (en
banc) (no admissible evidence could be derived from lost items).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol31/iss3/9

56

Axelrod: The Need for an Evidentiary Privilege for the Use of Lie Detector
1980]
LIE DETECTOR PRIVILEGE

deprives the defendant of a fair trial only if the withheld evidence
is sufficiently material to his innocence and the persons in possession of it are sufficiently associated with the prosecution.
The Brady doctrine will be considered applicable in this section to information favorable to a defendant that can arise in the
course of the prosecutor's lie detector examinations. As will be
seen, these may not necessarily constitute Brady material. First,
the result of the examination could be that the witness is lying
in response to the relevant question, which is usually the accusation of the defendant. Second, the witness may make an admission unrelated to the relevant question, but useful to impeach his
credibility if he testifies at trial. Third, the witness could make a
confession to the relevant question. In that instance, the witness
would admit to the operator that his initial statement to the
police, upon which the relevant question was based, was a lie.
These three prospects represent the three kinds of lie detector
information discussed earlier. Additionally, the witness may tell
the operator information about the case that was not previously
disclosed to the prosecution. This new information could be anything from a confession of the crime itself to a lead concerning
further evidence.
1. ProsecutorialControl.-To apply Brady at all, it must be
shown that the prosecution or someone sufficiently closely connected with the prosecution has control over the item favorable
to the defense. In this regard, persons working as part of the
prosecution team have been treated as equivalent to the prosecutor; police fall into this category.' Since many of the prosecutor's
examinations will be performed by operators who are members of
the police force, the information they gain will be deemed to be
in the prosecutor's control. In the event the operator is an independent tester working on a case-by-case basis for the prosecution, the same conclusion should be reached. Because of the nature of his task, he will be better apprised of the intricacies of the
case than would most forensic police experts."' He'needs as good
a background as possible on the focus and status of the investigation in order to properly formulate the questions in the examination. In fact, inadequacies of the operator's background informa112. Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964). The matter has virtually ceased
to be worthy of mention in later cases. See United States v. Sutton, 542 F.2d 1239 (4th
Cir. 1976).
113. J. RFiD & F. INBAU, supra note 1, at 11.
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tion may invalidate his results."' He has more complete information than other forensic experts who work in a police uniform. A
ballistics expert, for example, need not know the time of day or
place of a shooting to match up a rifle with a bullet. While it
might be unfair to saddle a Brady obligation on an independent
expert who could not recognize when evidence is favorable to the
defense, the independent lie detector operator is so well informed
that no unreasonable burden exists. He knows as much about the
prosecutor's case as does any police lie detector operator or even
any other policeman, and his work is done at the prosecutor's
bidding. Moreover, his function is to directly help the process of
prosecution." 5 For these reasons, he should be viewed as falling
within the ambit of the prosecutor's control. In other discovery
settings, various independent experts working for the prosecution
have been treated, for purposes of their work, as equivalent to the
prosecutor for discovery purposes."'
2. The Favorable Nature of the Prosecutor'sInformation:
Materiality.-The Brady doctrine requires disclosure only if the
114. In United States v. Lanza, 356 F. Supp. 27 (M.D. Fla. 1973), affl'd, 489 F.2d 554
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909 (1975), a defendant was prosecuted as part of a
gambling conspiracy. Evidence showed that he helped finance loans for the operation. A
specific $30,000 loan was shown. That information was not made available to the operator,
however, and the relevant questions in the examination were: "Did you give money to
Harlan Blackburn for the operation of illegal gambling activities?" and "For illegal purposes, did you give money to Harlan Blackburn?" Id. at 31 (emphasis added). Defendant
passed the test. No stipulation was made concerning admissibility, but the defendant
attempted to lay a foundation for the operator's conclusion that the defendant truthfully
denied criminality. The court refused the results as evidence on the ground that the
questions were flawed by the ambiguity of "loan" and "give" and the ambiguity of the
purpose of the money for a "loan" or for an "illegal gambling operation." Id. at 32.
115. Those agencies that work to help the prosecutor are the ones that come into
direct contact with exculpatory evidence. Brady imputes the same obligation to those
investigating on the prosecution's behalf that it imposes on the prosecutor. Any other
approach would severely dilute the operation of Brady, making it dependent on the whim
of the investigators. United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (concerning
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs). The fact that the prosecutor's work is accomplished by a particular compartment of government that does not ordinarily prosecute
does not alter the reality of the situation; the persons with evidence are acting with the
prosecutor. Thus, while the Postal Service may not ordinarily be an "arm" of the prosecution, its cooperation in the bribery prosecution of one of its employees renders its personnel
files within the Brady range of control. United States v. Deutsch, 475 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.
1973). Lack of such cooperation may produce the opposite result for a government agency
not linked systematically to prosecution. United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199 (7th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 87 (1979). See United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265
(5th Cir. 1977) (preparation of a probation report not considered prosecutorial activity).
116. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239 (1975); United States v. Bryant,
439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Zagel & Carr, supra note 32, at 600, app. A(I)(F) & (G).
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items in question are sufficiently favorable to the defense; such
evidence is said to be material to the defense. The question of
adequate materiality is more complicated than that of control.
Information or items that would be helpful to the defendant's
case are not necessarily material to the extent that withholding
them will deprive the defendant of a fair trial. To determine the
materiality of withheld evidence courts consider both the level of
the impact of the evidence on the trial and the level of obligation
that the prosecutor failed to meet. In Agurs v. United States" 7 the
Supreme Court enunciated three categories of prosecutorial withholding, and three corresponding standards of materiality. The
categories of prosecutorial action"' can be viewed as three issues:" 9 (1) whether the prosecutor knowingly allowed the use of
perjured testimony or false evidence at trial, (2) whether he withheld exculpatory evidence even though the defendant specifically
requested it, and (3) whether he withheld exculpatory evidence
in the absence of a specific request. The categories are ranked in
order of the prosecutor's dereliction of his duty. The standards of
materiality that apply to these three categories can likewise be
stated as the three corresponding issues that follow: 12 (1) whether
there is any reasonable likelihood the false testimony could have
affected the judgment of the jury; (2) whether the suppressed
evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial; and (3)
whether the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did
not otherwise exist. Once the prosecutor's action is categorized
the corresponding standard of materiality is applied. For exam117. 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
118. Although the Supreme Court has steadfastly denied the relevance of the prosecutor's good faith in deciding on the propriety of a new trial, Agurs v. United States, 427
U.S. 97, 110 (1976); Brady v. Maryland, 363 U.S. 63, 87 (1963), the Brady doctrine in effect
punishes the excesses of the prosecution. Not surprisingly, therefore, courts have implicitly and explicitly continued to place emphasis on the prosecutor's good faith. See note
111 supra. In United States v. Disston, 582 F.2d 1108 (7th Cir. 1978), the court stated:
[A]lthough good faith or bad faith of the prosecutor is irrelevant if the evidence
is material, the good faith or bad faith may well bear on the materiality determination ....
"[A] court should be less inclined to hold unproduced evidence
immaterial or to hold the non-production of admittedly material evidence harmless error if the prosecutor's failure to reveal the evidence was not in good faith
Id. at 1112 (citations omitted). See United States v. DePalma, 461 F.2d 240 (9th Cir.
1972); Lessard v. Dickson, 394 F.2d 88, 91 (9th Cir. 1968) (sub rosa use of the prosecutor's
good faith).
119. Agurs v. United States, 427 U.S. 97, 103-14 (1976).
120. Id.
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ple, if the prosecution knowingly uses perjured testimony, the
defendant is entitled to a new trial if the perjury gave rise to a
reasonable likelihood that the judgment of the jury was affected.
B.

The Application of Brady to Lie Detectors

1. The Knowing Use of False Evidence.-The standards
applicable to the knowing use of perjury are most favorable to
the defendant. With respect to lie detector examinations, the
only instance in which the first standard of materiality is clearly
appropriate is when the witness admits to the operator that his
original statement to the prosecutor was a lie and the prosecutor
nonetheless calls the witness to testify to his original statement.
If, as is more likely, the witness is not called to testify to that
proposition, the admission no longer falls in the first category
since no false evidence will be elicited from the witness at trial.
Arguably, the same analysis applies when the witness makes no
such statement to the operator but fails the examination. Although one might hope that such a witness would not be used by
the prosecutor, the results raise the question of how certain the
prosecutor must be that his witness is perjuring himself before the
first standard applies. The only reported cases applying the first
standard concern conclusive evidence of falsehood or perjury,'2 '
as, for example, when the witness testifies that no promise of
leniency has been made but the police or prosecution have actually made such promises. Since the reliability of the examination to show perjury is considerably lower than the reliability of
direct personal knowledge of a prosecutor or policeman, these
cases do not support the use of the first standard. Failure of the
test merely impairs the credibility of the witness, as would a prior
statement showing bias against the defendant. As such, for a new
trial to be granted, the withholding of the failing result would
have to be held to have either affected the outcome of the trial
or to have created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.
In the event that, during the lie detector examination, the
121. See note 110 supra. When the first category has been applied for the prosecutor's
knowing use of false evidence, there has been no dispute concerning the knowledge of the
prosecution that the material was false. The potential inaccuracy of the lie detector would
prevent the defendant from arguing that the prosecutor knew the witness was testifying
falsely because the witness failed the lie detector test. In Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786
(1972), the Court accepted the prosecution's characterization of "mistake" when the testimony of one of its witnesses regarding the defendant was proved untrue after trial.
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witness admits that he initially lied when he spoke to the police,
the prosecution may nonetheless call him to the stand to testify
to his revised account of the crime. The only Brady problem
would be the discoverability of the prior inconsistent statement.
Although that statement would receive second or third category
treatment, depending on the presence of a specific request, the
statement would not affect the impact of Brady on a lie detector
privilege. The matter would be irrelevant to any exchange between the subject and the operator.
Assuming the prosecutor's witness passes the lie detector
test, he may make statements that impeach his credibility but do
not relate to the factual content of the proposed testimony. The
concern here is with admissions of prior misconduct, as well as
admissions of bias toward the defendant. As this material involves no palpably false testimony by the witness, the first category, which accords the greatest indulgence towards the defense,
is inapplicable. No knowing use of perjury could be expected. It
remains to determine how Brady has been applied to impeachment evidence.
2. The Withholding of Evidence that Impeaches the Witness: Admissions of Prior Criminal Activity Unrelated to the
Crime.-Evidence that impeaches the witness is not sufficiently
material for Brady treatment if the defense is already aware of
substantial additional impeachment evidence. Depending on the
presence of a specific request,1 2 a new trial will be granted because of the withholding of impeachment evidence only if it
might have affected the outcome of the trial or if it would have
created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. If credibility of the witness has effectively been impeached without withheld evidence the impact of the prosecutor's error is merely cumulative. 1 Thus, withholding evidence of one conviction when
several others are known does not deprive the defendant of a fair
122. In Agurs, a request for Brady material was characterized as too general to specifically apprise the prosecution of its duty. 427 U.S. at 107. Some ambiguity remains
concerning when a request is specific. Compare Ostrer v. United States, 577 F.2d 782 (2d
Cir. 1978) (a request for "impeaching material" does not specifically request letters written by prosecutor that had the effect of rewarding witness cooperation) with United States
v. McCrane, 547 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1976) (a request for impeaching material specifically
calls for the promises made to prosecution witnesses). Presumably, a request for impeaching statements made by the subject of an examination would be sufficiently specific to
include the appropriate lie detector information.
123. See Ostrer v. United States, 577 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1978).
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trial. Since cross-examination usually aims with some success at
the credibility of the witness, courts have been sparing in the.
application of Brady to impeachment material.'2 4 Some courts
have even held that impeachment is not contemplated by Brady
because it is not directly favorable to the defendant;' 25 they have
applied a more stringent due process standard for a new trial.
This position is untenable in light of the cases following Brady
concerning perjury. The harm to the defendant in those cases is

that the trier of fact lacks evidence of the unreliability of the
witness rather than evidence that directly declares the defendant's innocence. The majority of jurisdictions has explicity held
Brady applicable to the withholding of evidence that impeaches
the prosecutor's witness.' 6 These cases have also indicated, however, that impeachment evidence is presumed to be less significant than other evidence and is only rarely characterized as material. For example, in Calley v. Calloway 27 the attorney representing Lieutenant Calley, accused of perpetrating the My Lai massacre, sought transcripts of privileged testimony by prosecution witnesses before a Senate subcommittee. The sole stated purpose of
the request was to obtain material to impeach the witnesses at
the upcoming trial. Applying Brady after the conviction, but rejecting the motion for a new trial, the Fifth Circuit held that
124. Id. at 782; United States v. Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
99 S. Ct. 87 (1979); United States v. Judon, 567 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1978); United States
v. Brady, 566 F.2d 649, 656 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 965 (1979); Annunziato
v. Manson, 566 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1977) (knowing presentation of perjured testimony);
United States v. Cantri, 557 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1977); Evans v. Janing, 489 F.2d 470 (8th
Cir. 1973).
125. United States v. Martin, 565 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Miller,
499 F.2d 736 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Harris, 462 F.2d 1033 (10th Cir. 1972) (a
court should instead inquire if the trial was unacceptably unfair); McDonald v. State, 553
P.2d 171, 180 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976); see United States v. Flores, 540 F.2d 432 (10th
Cir. 1976). Contra, United States v. Ostrer, 577 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1978); United States v.
Weidman, 572 F.2d 1199 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 87 (1978); United States v.
Brady, 566 F.2d 649 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 79 (1978); United States v.
Deegan, 268 F. Supp. 580 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); People v. Rutherford, 14 Cal. 3d 399, 534 P.2d
1341, 121 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1974); Nelson v. State, 59 Wis. 2d 474, 208 N.W.2d 410 (1973).
Courts taking this position have relied on Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786 (1972), in which
the withholding of evidence that impeached a witness to an alleged inculpatory statement
by the defendant was held not sufficiently prejudicial for a new trial. The Supreme Court
noted that the evidence withheld did not specifically impeach the identification of the
defendant as the murderer. Id. at 797. These other courts appear to have confused this
factor of impact on the trial with the separate question of whether evidence is favorable
and therefore pertinent to the inquiry necessitated by Brady.
126. See note 125 supra.
127. 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
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[w]hen Brady is invoked to obtain information not favorable
on the issue of guilt or innocence, but useful for attacking the
credibility of a prosecution witness, the information withheld
must have a definite impact on the credibility of an important
prosecution witness in order for the non-disclosure to require
reversal. '
The court went on to analyze the role of each witness at trial for
whom impeachment was sought and concluded that since the
evidence withheld could not be found to be of a "crucial, critical,
highly significant nature,"'2 9 adequate materiality had not been
established.
Further indication that mere impeaching statements will not
be discoverable under Brady derives from the treatment given
requests for prior criminal convictions of prosecution witnesses.
Courts have been unwilling to invoke a per se rule of disclosure,
although many have required pretrial discovery of criminal records as a matter of discretion.'3 The decision by the prosecutor
128. 519 F.2d at 222.
129. Id. at 223.
130. E.g., United States v. Battisti, 486 F.2d 961 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Conder, 423 F.2d 904, 910 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 (1971) (Brady obligation to disclose criminal records ripens, if at all, at trial); United States v. Frumento, 405
F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Jepson, 53 F.R.D. 289 (E.D. Wis. 1971);
Lewis v. United States, 393 A.2d 109, 116-17 (D.C. App. 1978) (citing cases discussing
Brady obligation to disclose witness criminal records). The obligation to produce is distinct from the obligation to produce in advance of trial. Criminal records generally require
little additional investigation to uncover, thus, the timing of their delivery has not been
a subject of much discussion in light of Brady. See United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904
(6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 (1971); United States v. Trainor, 423 F.2d 263
(1st Cir. 1970) (impeaching material need not be disclosed before trial); United States v.
Bloom, 78 F.R.D. 591, 616-17 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (accelerated discovery advisable because of
complex nature of case); United States v. Frumento, 405 F. Supp. 23 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
United States v. Leta, 60 F.R.D. 127, 131 (M.D. Pa. 1973). The court in United States v.
Cobb, 271 F. Supp. 159 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) expressed the problem this way:
We recognize that although Brady, Giles, and Napue and similar decisions have
dealt solely with suppression of evidence at trial rather than before trial, the
object of the Due Process Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment is to assure a
fair trial to the accused and that there may be instances where disclosure of
exculpatory evidence for the first time during trial would be too late to enable
the defendant to use it effectively in his own defense, particularly if it were to
open the door to witnesses or documents requiring time to be marshalled and
presented.
Id. at 163 (footnotes omitted). See United States v. Baxter, 492 F.2d 150, 174 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 801 (1973) (equating prejudicial delay with suppression); United
States v. Goldman, 439 F. Supp. 337, 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); State v. McGee, 91 Ariz. 101,
370 P.2d 261, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 844 (1962); Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159,
410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966); State v. Thompson, 50 Del. 456, 134 A.2d 266 (1957)
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to withhold disclosure of these statements, in accordance with a
promise of confidentiality or a privilege, would not often come
into conflict with his obligations under Brady. "I
Similar treatment might be expected for the obligation to
disclose the result that a witness failed the examination. If results
were admissible'32 they would bear strongly on the credibility of
the witness. Unlike impeaching statements of prior criminal activity or bias, the results would be focused on a specific factual
statement by the witness and entitled to more indulgence by the
court. Results are not generally admissible, however, and most
courts that have confronted the issue have simply held that information that is not itself admissible cannot be favorable to the
defendant. 33
3. The Prospect of Defense Investigation.-The position
that the inadmissibility of lie detector results precludes Brady
treatment is unfortunate and is inconsistent with the position of
a number of courts that analyze materiality in terms of what
(results denied to defendant without reason); Anderson v. State, 241 So. 2d 390, 395 (Fla.
1970), modified on other grounds, 408 U.S. 938 (1972); Zupp v. State, 258 Ind. 625, 283
N.E.2d 540 (1972); State v. Christopher, 149 N.J. Super. 269, 373 A.2d 705 (App. Div.
1977).
In Zupp, Justice DeBruler concurred but disagreed with the analysis of the majority,
stating that the information in the exam should be treated as witness statements for
purposes of discovery. 258 Ind. at 631, 283 N.E.2d at 593 (DeBruler, J., concurring).
131. Moreover, the distinction between prior convictions and prior criminal acts clarifies the insignificance of the impact of Brady on lie detector privilege. First, the prosecutor frequently learns of prior convictions of his witness through other sources. The use of
the lie detector thus would not add to the amount of Brady material in the case. Second,
prior acts, in contrast with convictions, are frequently inadmissible for the purpose of
impeachment and therefore may not be considered Brady material. Thus, neither convictions nor prior criminal acts disclosed in the examinations are likely to give rise to any
additional Brady obligation that would interfere with a lie detector privilege.
132. A few courts have held that when the prosecution uses the lie detector as an
investigative device, it is estopped from denying admissibility on the grounds of reliability. Under Brady, the results are then discoverable. United States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp.
522 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); State v. Christopher, 134 N.J. Super. 263, 339 A.2d 239 (Law Div.
1975), rev'd, 149 N.J. Super. 269, 373 A.2d 705 (App. Div. 1977).
133. With respect to the Brady treatment of lie detector results, Ballard v. Superior
Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1966); Anderson v. State, 241 So.
2d 390 (Fla. 1970); and Zupp v. State, 258 Ind. 625, 283 N.E.2d 540 (1972), equate
inadmissibility with immateriality. See generallyUnited States v. Hart, 344 F. Supp. 522
(E.D.N.Y. 1971). With respect to other kinds of evidence, courts have treated admissibility as a telling, if not decisive, factor, Stokes v. State, 402 A.2d 376 (Del. 1979); United
States v. Sedgwick, 345 A.2d 465 (D.C. App. 1975), a view consistent with the lack of any
prosecutory obligation to develop information that is otherwise unfavorable to the defendant. See note 135 infra.
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other evidence that withheld information may produce,'34 rather
than solely in terms of the evidentiary value of the information
itself. Although Brady has not been interpreted to require the
prosecutor to develop evidence for the defendant,'35 it has been
applied when the item withheld points to specific fruitful investigation by the defense.
In Grant v. Alldredge' 6 defendant was convicted of bank
robbery and sought a new trial on the ground that the government
withheld eyewitness identification of an alternative suspect to the
alleged crime. The materiality standard was applied not to the
materiality of the simple misidentification, but rather to what a
skilled attorney might be capable of developing from the withheld
evidence. In construing an earlier Second Circuit opinion, the
court held that
[i]t is instructive to note that the phrase "developed by skilled
counsel as it would have been" does not necessarily restrict the
scope of our inquiry to show how the "added item" would have
been used at the trial itself but would rather seem to be of
sufficient latitude to permit us to examine how defense counsel
might have utilized his knowledge of the "added item" in
preparationfor the trial.' 7
In reversing the conviction, the court discussed the logical inquiries the defense attorney would have made upon being informed
134. This distinction was made for lie detector results in State v. Young, 89 Wash.
2d 613, 574 P.2d 1171, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 870 (1978).
135. United States v. Walker, 559 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1977) (location of witness);
United States v. Beaver, 524 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 905 (1976)
(no obligation for prosecutor to investigate techniques of fingerprint identification when
information was equally available to the defendant); United States v. Gonzales, 466 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1972) (location of a witness the defendant wished to interview); Commonwealth v. Lewinski, 367 Mass. 889, 329 N.E.2d 738 (1975) (government need not have
tested alleged sperm sample in murder victim when there was no expectation of a result
favorable to the defense).
136. 498 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1974).
137. Id. at 381 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). See United States v. Harrison, 524 F.2d 421 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Lee v. State, 531 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. App. 1978). In
United States v. DeMarco, 407 F. Supp. 107 (C.D. Cal. 1975), the withheld evidence was
prejudicial under Brady not because it was admissible, but because it would have helped
the defense argue that crucial prosecution evidence was inadmissible. The prosecution
presented to the jury an account of the defendant's admission, but it withheld evidence
showing that the admissions made were actually by the defendant's attorney and should
thus have been inadmissible. See Lee v. United States, 388 F.2d 737 (9th Cir. 1968); see
generally Note, The Right to Independent Testing: A New Hitch in the Preservationof
Evidence Doctrine, 75 COLUM: L. Rxv. 1355 (1975); Note, Toward a ConstitutionalRight
to an Adequate Police Investigation: A Step Beyond Brady, 53 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 835, 859
(1978).
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of the misidentification and the likelihood of their success in
producing new evidence.
For the purposes of Brady a lie detector result showing that
a witness lied to a specific inquiry may be, in the circumstances
of the case, more like a factual statement by the witness relating
to the crime than a statement used for impeachment. It may thus
point to obvious and fruitful investigation by the defense and
should be so treated.'38 A witness may state that only one other
person, the defendant, was present at the crime. The witness may
then fail an examination for that proposition. Knowledge of that
failure would prompt special questions and inquiries by the defense on the assumption that another witness exists. The existence of lie detector results available to the defense under Brady,
however, poses no problems for a lie detector privilege since the
protected confidentiality concerns unrelated admissions made in
the course of the examination and not the results themselves.
4. Additional Information Provided by the Witness.-A
remaining consideration is what Brady treatment is appropriate
to statements made by the witness in the course of the examination that relate directly to the crime being investigated. Assuming the witness is not called to testify to this proposition, the
statement itself nonetheless may be discoverable. If the witness
has inculpated himself and in so doing has exculpated the defendant, the course of the prosecution would be expected to change,
138. Some courts have recognized the aid in investigations that lie detectors provide.
In Commonwealth v. Talley, 456 Pa. 574, 318 A.2d 922 (1974), the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania approved a trial court's denial of funds for a lie detector expert to test the
defendant on the ground that the results would be inadmissible. Justice Nix, concurring
in result only, noted:
It was asserted that these tests would better enable defense counsel to evaluate
the evidence with regard to appellant's intent and capacity in determining his
criminal responsibility. The question presented is whether there was any basis
for refusing those procedures in the preparation of the defense. The request for
these tests was clearly reasonable under the circumstances. The extensive use
of the tests by the prosecution in criminal investigation indicates that they are
recognized investigatory tools.
Id. at 580, 318 A.2d at 926 (Nix, J., concurring in result). Other courts have recognized
the investigative potential for the defendant to be tested and noted that admissibility may
be accomplished, with proper foundation, in the defendant's test. Commonwealth v. A
Juvenile, 365 Mass. 421, 313 N.E.2d 120 (1974); People v. Barbara, 400 Mich. 352, 255
N.W.2d 171 (1977) (usefulness in motion for a new trial); State v. Shaw, 90 N.M. 540,
565 P.2d 1057 (1977). It is but a short step to consider the lie detector tests of others as
useful to the defendant and admissible under Brady as leading to favorable evidence.
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thereby eliminating Brady obligations to this defendant.'39 Moreover, after such a statement the prosecution would probably attempt to corroborate the truth of the statement and continue to
further interrogate the witness; a subsequent confession may include a waiver of any lie detector privilege.
If the witness does not inculpate himself, but instead makes
a statement that tends to prove part of the defense theory, Brady
would apply to the statement."'4 This conclusion presents no substantial conflict with a lie detector privilege because such a statement is unlikely to be made solely to the lie detector operator.
The lie detector presumably is particularly powerful in securing
admissions from the subject; concerning background information
to the crime, however, the police or other investigators have already obtained the same information from the witness. If they
have, there may be Brady obligations, but the obligations do not
burden the use of a lie detector privilege because of their applicability to all the persons on the prosecution team that have talked
to the witness. Since the prosecutor already has Brady obligations
with respect to these other persons on the prosecution team that
have talked to the witness; since the prosecutor already has
Brady obligations with respect to these other persons, a lie detector examination poses no incremental risk to his case in this respect.
In sum, the lie detector is unlikely to give rise to Brady
information with sufficient frequency to render a privilege for the
prosecutor's witnesses unworkable. The results themselves, if discoverable notwithstanding their inadmissibility, do not pose a
threat to the confidentiality of unrelated admissions. Statements
that are merely impeaching are not frequently required to be
revealed. Cases in which the witness makes a confession to the
crime are unlikely to continue to trial, but when they do, those
statements likely have lost their privileged character through further interrogation. Finally, statements about facts of the case are
likely to be revealed to other police as well as to the lie detector
operator; unlike admissions, there is no reason to suppose that
139. Once the prosecution shifted to the confessing witness, the present defendant
would no longer be prosecuted.

140. It is assumed this statement is sufficiently favorable to warrant Brady treatment, as when the defendant pleads self-defense to an assault charge and seeks to show
peculiar aggressive activity by the victim, and the subject-witness discloses that the
victim appeared to be under the influence of a hallucinogen.
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the operator is more likely to receive such information than other
police investigators. Moreover, if the witness admits to the operator that he is lying in response to the relevant question of the
examination and either does not subsequently testify or subsequently testifies in a manner consistent with his last statement,
the Brady problem exists not with respect to his statement to the
operator, but only with respect to his prior inconsistent statement
to the prosecutor or police. Thus, the burden that Brady would
actually place on a lie detector privilege is probably very small.
A PROPOSED EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGE-PROTECTING THE AccuRACY AND UTILITY OF THE LIE DETECTOR EXAMINATION IN CRIMINAL
V.

CASES

A.

The Necessity of Privilege

The use of lie detectors in the criminal justice system depends upon the availability of protection for the confidentiality
promised by the operator to the subject. If the promise cannot be
made by the operator or if the subject otherwise fears disclosure
of unrelated admissions, the test will be less accurate.14 ' If attorneys cannot test witnesses without risking the creation of admissions that will be used for impeachment or subsequent unrelated
prosecution, the test is less likely to be used. Since the promise
of confidentiality does not encompass confessions to the matter
investigated, and such confidentiality is unnecessary for the accuracy of the examination, the privilege would not cover such
statements."' The doctrines currently available to preserve confidentiality are not sufficient. The attorney-client privilege, workproduct doctrine, and fifth amendment provide protection that is
141. See notes 8-14 and accompanying text supra.The absence of a credible promise
or a reasonable assumption of confidentiality impedes the formation of a proper control
question and enhances the possibility that the operator will draw an erroneous inference
from the subject's anxiety.
142. The obtaining of confessions is not essential to the accuracy of the examination.
Operators can be instructed to avoid confessions. The frequency of examinations designed
to elicit a confession rather than a reliable result is not going to be affected by the proposed
privilege. A privilege to protect confessions stands on weaker ground than one concerned
only with unrelated admissions because no promise of confidentiality is made to the
subject in that regard and because no impairment of the control question is at stake. Such
a privilege would serve only one purpose-to encourage the use of lie detectors by eliminating any possible adverse consequence. Lie detectors are not different from other, unprivileged, forms of investigation in their ability to produce damaging information; such a
privilege is thus unlikely to be recognized.
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either too narrow or too unpredictable for the widespread use of
lie detection. Thus, more protection is needed.
B.

The Proposed Privilege

The reason extant doctrines are not adequate for the protection of the lie detector operator's promise of confidentiality is that
they are not directly concerned with the merits of lie detection for
the criminal justice system, but rather with their related, yet
distinctive interests, such as the relationship between attorney
and client. An evidentiary privilege for lie detectors, drafted to
match the need to protect confidentiality, is the most appropriate
way to achieve this protection. The decision to recognize such a
privilege is simply the decision to continue an important practice
of criminal investigation.
The following privilege satisfies the need to protect confidentiality but imposes a minimal evidentiary cost on the criminal
justice system:
No statement made by the subject of a lie detector examination
shall be disclosed by the operator if the statement is not related
to the specific matter under investigation, unless the subject
gives his permission. Waiver of the privilege is a necessary condition for the admission into evidence of the results of the examination. An operator may consult with his fellow experts in arriving at his conclusion without violating the privilege.
This privilege could be created either judicially or legislatively.
Since the motivation behind the privilege will be more apparent
to persons within the criminal justice system, as opposed to those
in the legislature, judicial approaches to the concept of privilege
are pertinent. Legislatures may, of course, create an evidentiary
privilege, but they are unlikely to do so in this case without encouragement by the judiciary.'
143. The Supreme Court has, however, discouraged Congress from expanding the
evidentiary privileges currently recognized. Congress has nonetheless been responsive to
concerns outside the immediate environs of litigation. The Supreme Court's Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence 501-510 (1974) recognized a limited number of traditional
privileges and provided:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress, and except as provided in these rules or in other rules
adopted by the Supreme Court, no person has a privilege to:
(1) Refuse to be a witness; or
(2) Refuse to disclose any matter; or
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The Judicial Approaches to Privilege

An evidentiary privilege is a rule that forbids, in an absolute
or qualified way, the admission of otherwise relevant evidence on
the ground that some value external to the specific litigation will
be compromised. For example, a statement made in confidence
by client to attorney is privileged because of the need to protect
and nurture attorney-client communications. Similarly, at common law, one spouse could not testify against the other, particularly concerning confidential communications between them, for
fear of creating dissension that would upset the intimacy of mari(3) Refuse to produce any object or writing; or
(4) Prevent another from being a witness or disclosing any matter or
producing any object or writing.
Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 501 (1974).
After a debate in which many argued that courts should be free to protect confidential
relationships in a broader way than allowed by the proposed rules because of the importance of the humanitarian values implicated, Congress instead passed the present Rule
501:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or
political subdivision thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common
law as they be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of
reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect
to an element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of
decision, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined in accordance with State law.
FED. R. EvID. 501. See Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings Before the Special Comm.
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1t Sess., 101 (1974); 2 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 75, at 501[01]-[02]; Black, The
Marital and PhysicianPrivileges:A Reprint of a Letter to a Congressman, 1975 DuKE L.J.
45; Krattenmaker, Interpersonal Testimonial Privileges Under the Federal Rules of Evidence: A Suggested Approach, 64 GEo. L.J. 613 (1976); Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TuL. L. REv. 101 (1956).
Many comments were made to the House Committee that the proposed system of privileges was too narrow to protect confidential relationships and that the judiciary should
not have the only input to the evaluation of privileges since state and federal legislative
input were also appropriate. E.g., ProposedRules of Evidence: HearingsBefore the Special Comm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
supra at 142 (Justice Goldberg); id. at 158 (Attorney Halpern); id. at 200 (Attorney
Spielberg); id. at 246 (Judge Friendly).
The judicial hostility to evidentiary privileges, see notes 148-49 and accompanying
text infra, may partly rest on the greater salience to the courts of the costs rather than
the benefits of excluding evidence. The proposed privilege will not have this problem: its
benefits should be obvious to courts because lie detector examinations directly aid in the
resolution of disputes. A number of state legislatures have indeed granted privilege, if not
protection, to- lie detector information. See note 75 supra.
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tal trust. 44 Additionally, if a journalist always can be compelled
to reveal his confidential sources, the coverage of current events
will suffer; to protect the public's interest in being informed,
therefore, the newsman has a qualified privilege to resist such
disclosure. The protection varies with the facts of the case and the
nature of the information withheld."'
The nature of the values these three privileges protect is
diverse. In varying degrees, however, they share certain characteristics possessed by the proposed privilege for lie detector examinations. Each privilege furthers a valuable relationship. Each
involves a communication made in confidence that, if routinely
disclosed, will demean the relationship. The diversity of the factual settings of these privileges prompts one to ask why there is
not a great profusion of evidentiary privileges that share these two
characteristics. Although this set of privileges is by no means
exhaustive, the law has been hostile to the concept of privilege
because of the incidental loss of reliable evidence to the trier of
fact;'" a profusion of privileges would operate to make much
evidence unavailable at trial and thus would impair the socially
valued ability of courts to resolve disputes fairly. With a little
ingenuity, one can design a privilege for almost any case. In 1937,
for example, an investor charged with fraudulently manipulating
stock prices resisted the production of his records kept by his
stockbroker on the ground that his relationship to his brokers
would be harmed and the records, thus, should be privileged. In
rejecting the claim, Judge Learned Hand noted that
[a] broker is indeed an agent, and as such a fiduciary; he is
bound to act for his customer, and not to betray to others what
he may learn in the course bf his duties. On the other hand the
duty to disclose in a court all pertinent information within one's
control, testimonially or by the production of documents, is
144. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 64, at §§ 2228, 2322.
145. Although an absolute privilege by way of the first amendment to the United

States Constitution is no longer available, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), courts
still treat newsmen's research as having a qualified privilege. See id. at 710 (Powell, J.,
concurring); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433 (10th Cir. 1977); Carey v.
Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Wright v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n, 72 F.R.D.
161, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D.
388 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Apicella v. McNeil Laboratories, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 78 (E.D.N.Y. 1975);
Note, Protection from Discovery of Researchers' Confidential Information: Richards of
Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 9 CoNN. L. Rxv. 326 (1977).
146. See notes 148-49 and accompanying text infra.
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usually paramount over any private interest which may be affected. There are of course the traditional privileges touching
communications made in certain confidential relations; but a
broker's customer is not a client, a penitent, a patient or a
spouse. Therefore, although we assume, as we do, that the conduct of investigations under these statutes is subject to the same
testimonial privileges as judicial proceedings, it will not serve
McMann; he must erect a new privilege ad hoc. The suppression
of truth is a grievous necessity at best, more especially when as
here the inquiry concerns the public interest; it can be justified
at all only when the opposed private interest is supreme. Very
near the end in the hierarchy of values which might dictate such
a privilege would be the secrecy of a man's speculations upon a
stock market in an inquiry into the existence of trade practices
which a statute has condemned. 4 '

Courts similarly have rejected or tempered the operation of other
claims of privilege because of interference with the collection of

evidence."'.
1. Wigmore's Test.-The judicial reluctance to expand the
number of evidentiary privileges reflects the sentiment of Wigmore,' whose criteria for the recognition or privilege are regularly cited. 5 ' Wigmore's test is stringent, and its use shows the
147. McMann v. SEtC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937).
148. The fact that one may have good reason not to testify has seldom been an
acceptable excuse. For example, betraying the confidence of a friend, though philosophically repugnant, is not the ground of privilege. United States v. Worcester, 190 F. Supp.
548 (D. Mass. 1961). Embarrassment or social disgrace was never widely accepted as a
privilege and currently has few judicial adherents. See J. WiGMORE, supra note 64, at § §
984, 986, 987; Carr v. Department No. 1, Secoiid Judicial Dist. Ct., 76 Nev. 403, 356 P.2d
16 (1960). See also United States v. Shoenheinz, 548 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1977) (refusing
to honor an employer-stenographer claim of privilege); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
Detroit, Mich., Aug., 1977, 434 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. Mich. 1977), affl'd, 570 F.2d 562 (6th
Cir. 1978) (narrowly construing attorney-client privileges so as to preclude protection for
communicating officer of corporation). See note 66 and accompanying text supra.
149. For more than three centuries it has been recognized as a fundamental
maxim that the public (in the words sanctioned by Lord Harwicke) has a right
to every man's evidence. When we come to examine the various claims of exception, we start with the primary assumption that there is a general duty to give
what testimony one is capable of giving and that any exemptions which may
exist are distinctly exceptional, being so many derogations from a positive general rule.
8 J. WIoMORE, supra note 64, at § 2192 (footnotes omitted).
150. E.g., Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 974 (1971); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.
1963); In re Capeda, 233 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Maginnis v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 207 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. La. 1962); Ernst & Ernst v. Underwriters Nat'l Assur. Co.,
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emphasis courts have placed on the value of reliable evidence.
Only if the following four factors are satisfied by a relationship
does Wigmore accede to the recognition of a privilege that protects related communications from disclosure:
(1) The communications must originate in a confidence

that they will not be disclosed.
(2)

This element of confidentiality must be essential to

the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between
the parties.
(3) The relation must be one in which the opinion of the
community ought to be sedulously fostered.
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the
disclosure of the communication must be greater than the
benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the litigation."5 '
Wigmore's test invites a comparison of the benefits that flow from
protecting the privileged relationship and the costs of the privilege to the litigation. For Wigmore's privileges the only cost is the
loss of reliable evidence, a prospect that Wigmore found abhorrent. These costs and benefits are usually ambiguous, and they
vary each time a privilege is considered within the context of a
given case. Wigmore responded to these uncertainties with a
preference for the admission of relevant evidence and the majority of courts has followed him. Since many of the uncertainties
will not apply to a lie detector privilege, Wigmore's preference
should not be invoked; rather, a fresh comparison of costs and
benefits should be made.
Wigmore's preference is manifest in his test. A communication shielded by privilege must have been made in confidence.
While it is true that the disclosure of a confidential communication may inhibit a relationship, the relationship can also be
harmed when its communications are not made in confidence.
Consider the friendship relationship. A communication made in
a crowded tavern would not be considered confidential. If one
friend were to repeat this conversation verbatim the next morning
to the speaker's business associates and family, however, the
friendship probably would suffer. Similarly, Wigmore requires
-

Ind. App.

_

381 N.E.2d 897 (1978); State v. Martin,

-

S.D. _,

274 N.W.

2d 893 (1979); Adams v. State, 563 S.W.2d 804 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1978); State v. Driscoll,
53 Wis. 2d 699, 193 N.W.2d 851 (1972).
151. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 64, at
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that the relationship be one that society "sedulously fosters." A
comparison of costs and benefits cannot stop with the assessment
of only one side of the balance. In theory, a moderately valuable
relationship could pose a minimal evidentiary cost for protection.
Finally, the requirement that confidentiality be essential to the
protected relationship sets a high standard of materiality between the protected communication and the injury to the valued
relationship. No similar prerequisite exists for the concomitant
evidentiary cost. Thus, only those disclosures that would seriously damage the relationship are eligible for comparison with the
evidence excluded, notwithstanding the importance of that evidence. Two other doctrines that concern disclosure are far more
responsive to the materiality of the evidence than Wigmore's criteria. The work-product doctrine'52 and the Brady doctrine' 13 both
focus on the importance of the evidence to a specific case. More
important evidence is more likely to be disclosed under those
doctrines. Wigmore has in effect assumed that the evidence is
very valuable.
Wigmore's manner of taking into account confidentiality, the
importance of the protected relationship, and the connection between the two, does not amount to a simple bias against privilege
or in favor of admitting reliable evidence. His approach is better
explained by his exclusive concern with privileges that protect
relationships whose value is wholly external to the litigation process. In other words, the value of the relationship is outside the
realm of the criminal justice system or any other judicial system.
Marital privileges, for example, protect marriages. Their only
connection with litigation is the coincidence that material germane to the marriage is also germane to particular litigation that
usually has nothing to do with the substance of the marital relationship. The coincidental connection between the privileged relationship and the protected evidence forces a court considering
the privilege to take one of two steps. In computing the cost of
the privilege, a court must either nake presumptions about the
value of the evidence in question, as Wigmore has done, or it must
measure the value of the evidence against the value of the relationship on a case-by-case basis. The latter approach is untenable
because to make such a balance disclosure of the protected com152. See notes 47-48 and accompanying text supra.
153. See notes 117-20 and accompanying text supra.
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munication would be necessary." 4 The very harm the privilege
sought to prevent would become incident to the invocation of the
privilege. Moreover, the decision to protect a specific communication in one case might change in the next case if the communication in the latter case were more important to the trier of fact.
The privilege would thus lose some of its major contributions to
protection: certainty and uniformity. Alternatively, the decision
made in any one case to exclude evidence is hindered by the
notion that precedent is supplied for the next case, which may be
entirely different. Thus, a judge suppressing evidence in a shoplifting case may be concerned that he will set a precedent with
regard to the specific communication and that the same communication may later prove relevant to a murder case. For Wigmore's privileges, there is no way to predict the ultimate evidentiary cost of protecting a specific communication.
An additional problem with the case-by-case approach is
that the protection afforded by the privilege is intended to affect
not just the very relationship in front of the court, which is a fait
accompli, but all similar relationships. The decision to avoid deterring confidential communications by protecting them with a
privilege is a decision to further a common human relationship
and is based upon the social value of all the instances of that
relationship, not upon the value of one particular instance. A
case-by-case consideration of the merits of the particular relationship before the court, therefore, is inappropriate. 15 Wigmore's
154. Occasionally, the nature of the evidence or its consequences may be known well
enough without disclosure that a better idea of the cost in evidence and to the relationship
can be gained. Thus, in Ryan v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 820 (1978), a married couple sought to resist an order to produce documents
regarding income tax returns on the ground that each spouse would be harming the other
in court, contrary to the policy of the common-law marital privilege against adverse
spousal testimony. The court, in requiring production, noted that the documents were not
likely to be of an intimate nature. Similarly, in United States v. Doe, 478 F.2d 194 (1st
Cir. 1973), the court refused to recognize a marital privilege concerning conversations
because each spouse was the recipient of transactional immunity and thus could not
supply evidence that would cause any criminal penalty to the other. A grant of transactional immunity to a witness guarantees that the witness will not be prosecuted for the
crime under investigation. Absent the prospect of prosecution, there can be no incrimination. See note 157 and accompanying text infra.
155. On occasion, the nature of the crime charged is relevant to the relationship itself.
In those instances, courts may decline to apply the privilege. The decision to protect even
those privileged relationships which are relatively unworthy does not require that courts
allow the privilege to destroy the very value of the relationship it should protect. E.g.,
United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1975) (policy of family harmony should
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resolution of this matter is to asume the evidence covered by the
privilege is valuable and to balance that assumed value against
the social value of the relationships similar to the one before the
court. For the privileges that concerned Wigmore,'56 his solution
is quite reasonable.
2. Reconsideration of Wigmore's Approach to Privilege in
Light of the Nature of Lie Detection.-The proposed lie detector
privilege does not present the same analytical problems as the
privileges Wigmore considered. The evidentiary cost of excluding
lie detector evidence is predictable and largely self-limiting. The
assumption that the evidence lost is valuable or that the cost of
the privilege is high is not appropriate to the analysis of a lie
detector privilege. More importantly, the relationship between
costs and benefits is different for lie detection because the benefits of the relationship are directly concerned with the costs of
losing evidence: both costs and benefits influence the ability of
the trier of fact to resolve disputes fairly. Wigmore's privileges
constitute a special kind of evidentiary situation in which the
protected relationship does not aid in the resolution of disputes;
however, the value of lie detection consists principally in the
resolution of disputes. Wigmore's analysis takes the view that
reliable evidence is of inherent value to the trier of fact. Wigmore's more general- concern, however, is with the fair resolution
of disputes. As long as the protected relationship has no impact
on that concern, other than through the operation of the privilege,
the distinction between evidence as inherently valuable and evidence as only part of the goal of dispute resolution is not important. For a lie detector privilege that distinction is crucial. The
wisdom of a lie detector privilege is dependent on the same analysis as the use of a testimonial immunity to acquire evidence from
a witness' 7 or a decision to invoke supervisory powers to exclude
not, by prohibiting spousal testimony, help man accused of raping his daughter). See cases
cited in note 70 supra (abuse of attorney-client relationship).
156. Wigmore considered privileges concerning the following relationships according
to the standard set forth in his treatise: attorney-client, 8 J. WIGMORE, surpa note 64 at
§§ 2290-2329; husband and wife, id. at §§ 2332-41; jurors and others, id. at §§ 2345-64;
physician and patient, id. §§ 2380-91; and priest and penitent, id. at §§ 2394-96. He
was critical of the physician-patient privilege, but found the rest consistent with his fourpart standard. He considered numerous other privileges unjustified, including those concerning communications to parents, bankers, accountants, and trustees. Id. at § 2286.
Legislatures are, of course, free to privilege any matter by statute as long as no constitutional right is impaired.
157. Most jurisdictions have statutes enabling the prosecutor to confer, through the
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confessions made during illegal detention.' 5 In each case, the
criminal justice system can be seen as foregoing the use of certain
evidence to enhance the ability of the system as an effective institution for the resolution of criminal issues. The focus in these
matters, as for a lie detector privilege, must exceed the courthouse walls and look to the efficiency of police, prosecution, and
defense, particularly since so many criminal cases never proceed
to trial.
(a) The evidentiary cost of the proposed privilege.-The
evidentiary cost of a lie detector privilege can be calculated with
much more precision than that of other privileges. When communications are made in the course of privileged relationships, such
as treatment in psychotherapy, their scope is broad. It is difficult
to determine what kind of use a communication might be put to
at some later date, both for the members of the relationship and
for the court that may subsequently be confronted with the issue.
The communication is unlikely to take the form of an admiscourt, testimonial-use immunity or transactional immunity on a witness. E.g., People v.
Denson, 16 Ill. App. 3d 230, 305 N.E.2d 263 (1973); State v. Mufich, 216 Kan. 297, 532
P.2d 1301 (1975); Bowie v. State, 14 Md. App. 567, 287 A.2d 782 (1972); People v. Gentile,
47 A.D.2d 930, 367 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1975); 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, §§ 106-1, 106-2 (Smith-Hurd 1970) (transactional); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 223415 (Vernon 1974) (transactional and testimonial use); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §§ 23,
24, 39, 262, 371, 400 (1976 & Michie Cum. Supp. 1979); N.Y. CalM. P. LAW §§ 50.20, 50.10
(McKinney 1971) (transactional).
Typically, the witness is unwilling to testify about a certain matter for fear of selfincrimination. These statutes allow the prosecutor to remove this fear, permitting the
matter to be fully investigated. The usual result is that someone other than the witness
is charged with crime. Under testimonial-use immunity, the witness is assured that nothing he says or anything that is the fruit of what he says will be used against him. Thus,
an accomplice in a bank robbery may testify under immunity that he was the getaway
driver and that the principal is another person. Neither that testimony nor the fruits of
any investigation spurred by that testimony can be used against the witness. If independent evidence exists, however, such as a prior confession or a videotape recording, the
witness can be prosecuted for his role in the robbery as long as no use is made of the
testimony he gave under immunity. Under transactional immunity, the witness is guaranteed that, regardless of any independent evidence, his testimony about a crime completely
precludes his prosecution for that crime. In the above example, the witness could no longer
be prosecuted for bank robbery if he were given transactional immunity, notwithstanding
the existence of independent incriminating evidence. Testimonial-use immunity is sufficient to avoid the fifth amendment bar against self-incrimination; transactional immunity
need not be granted to compel a witness to testify. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S.
441 (1972).

158. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943). See generally Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supervisory Powers, 69
COLUM. L. REv. 181 (1969).
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sion.'55 That form implies an obvious use, incrimination, to which
the communication may ultimately be applied. The lie detector
privilege is concerned specifically with admission. Given the natural aversion one has for self-incrimination, it reasonably can be
assumed that a person who fears to reveal the wrongdoing that is
the subject of the examination will not voluntarily reveal
wrongdoing that is even more serious. The examiner is not engaging in an open-ended discussion about the subject's day-to-day
activities, but rather is utilizing a technique designed to elicit
unrelated admissions. The implication of those admissions is
immediately apparent both to the subject and to the operator.
Therefore, for any given case, it is likely that the admissions obtained, though perhaps useful in evidence, do not cost the court
evidentiary matter that creates difficulty for the resolution of a
more serious crime. In other words, the cost of excluding the
evidence covered by the proposed lie detector privilege will generally concern evidence of a lesser crime than the one under investigation.
Unlike the evidence generated by other relationships, the lie
detector relationship does not bear a coincidental connection to
the value of the protected evidence that it creates. Exceptions to
this expectation may occasionally arise. For example, an examination given to a burglary suspect may yield an admission to an
unrelated murder. No privilege, however, operates with respect to
one relationship and one case at a time; by definition, privileges
exist with reference to the thousands of other relationships entered into by other persons who have nothing to do with the
litigation at hand. The attorney-client privilege is invoked to encourage communication between all clients and attorneys, even
though the specific attorney-client relationship protected by the
party invoking the privilege may not be unusually valuable or
may not be as important as the crucial evidence involved. Similarly, the proposed lie detector privilege is concerned with the
value of the widespread use of lie detection rather than protecting
159. An exception to this rule is the priest-penitent communication, which has a high
probability of incriminating the penitent. The social value of this relationship is extremely

high, however, and is widely considered worth its cost. The assumption that valuable
evidence is kept from the trier of fact is very accurate, but the countervailing value is high
enough that forty-four jurisdictions endorse the privilege. United States v. Mullen, 263
F.2d 275 (D.C. Cir. 1959); 2 J. WEINSTEIN, supra note 75 at T 506[01]-[03]; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 64, at § 2394.
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any one relationship at the cost of the specific evidence involved
therein.
Wigmore's test compares the value of the relationship to evidence that, by assumption, is inherently valuable. For lie detectors, a more appropriate assumption is that the evidence lost
concerns a criminal dispute less important than the one whose
resolution was originally sought through the lie detector examination. This second assumption is important as a qualification to
Wigmore's scheme because of the ambivalence some segments of
society have shown for the use of lie detection. 6 ' If the cost of the
privilege is inherently small, the protected relationship need not
be "sedulously fostered" by society for the privilege to be appropriate. For Wigmore's privileges, it is unwise to contemplate a
small cost because of the coincidental connection between the
protected relationship and the relevant evidence.
In addition to amending Wigmore's appraisal of the cost of
the privilege, courts should reexamine his approach to computing
the benefit. As is the case with costs, a reexamination of the
benefits makes a lie detector privilege more consistent with Wigmore's concerns and more appropriate for official recognition.
(b) The benefits of the proposedprivilege.-For Wigmore's
privileges, it is appropriate to ask what society stands to lose if
the corresponding relationships are not encouraged. This inquiry
is analytically distinct from the value of the evidence withheld by
the privilege. To evaluate fully the cost of the lie detector privilege to the criminal justice system, it is necessary to go beyond
the notion that reliable evidence is inherently valuable and to ask
whether the system, as a resolver of disputes, would suffer. In a
like manner, the benefits of a lie detector privilege focus on the
criminal justice system: Unlike the privileges Wigmore considered,"6 ' virtually all of the value of the lie detector examinations
used by defense and prosecution attorneys belongs inside, rather
than outside, the system. The value of lie detection is its aid to
the ultimate goal of the criminal court-the fair resolution of
criminal charges. The lie detector materially helps the just prose160. See Hearingson the Use of Polygraphsand Similar Devices by FederalAgencies
Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations,supra note 1; Polygraph
Control and Civil Liberties ProtectionAct: Hearings on S. 1845 Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitutionof the Senate, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 1 (1977-78).
161. The one privilege that might satisfy this criterion is the attorney-client privilege,
discussed in Section ]I.C. supra. Since it passes even Wigmore's test, its viability does
not depend on this consideration.

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

79

548

South
Carolina
Law Review,
31, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. [Vol.
9
31
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAWVol.
REVIEW

cution and defense of criminal charges, notwithstanding its moderate evidentiary cost. Since the value of lie detection to the
system more than justifies the cost of the privilege to the system,
the system should allow the privilege.
Defense attorneys and prosecutors have shown a willingness
to subject witnesses and defendants to lie detector examinations
as part of the process of investigation.'62 The test has been useful
in screening suspects and determining whether to use witnesses.
Police departments frequently have used them, especially in situations in which important matters are not readily susceptible to
ordinary kinds of proof, such as when issues of consent or uncorroborated identification arise. Accurate investigations and confidence in the truthfulness of witnesses are the foundation upon
which the criminal court rests. More accurate investigations insure that those who are° actually brought to trial are more likely
to be fairly accused and tried. Moreover, the prospect of admissions suggests an enhanced societal ability to resolve pending
criminal matters with highly efficient investigations. To the extent that those same matters do not clog the courtrooms, the
court is better able to deal fairly with matters that must be
resolved judicially. In addition, this increase in efficiency has a
subtle way of abating some of the unavoidable injustices in the
system. Quicker resolution, for example, lessens the possibility
that an indigent defendant who cannot raise bond money will
162. Hearings on the Use of Polygraphs and Similar Devices by Federal Agencies

Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, supra note 1, at 414
(testimony of Henry S. Dogin, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division,
Department of Justice); J. REID & F. INBAU supra note 1, at 296-303; Axelrod, supra note

1, at 153-61; McInerney, Routine Screening of CriminalSuspects by the Polygraph (LieDetector) Technique, 45 J. CmM. L.C. & P.S. 736 (1955); Tarlow, Admissibility of Poly-

graph Evidence in 1975: An Aid in Determining Credibilityin a Perjury-PlaguedSystem
26 HASTINGS L.J. 917, 957-74 (1975); Trovillo, Scientific Proof of Credibility, 22 TENN. L.
REV. 743, 758 (1953).
In People v. Reagan, 395 Mich. 306, 235 N.W.2d 581 (1975), the court held the
prosecutor bound by his bargain to dismiss charges upon the defendant's passing a lie

detector test. With regard to the generality of the practice, the court took "judicial notice
of the fact that polygraph use by prosecutors' offices, principally prior to the issuance of

a complaint, is not uncommon, and indeed is a useful investigatory device." Id. at 313,
235 N.W.2d at 584-85. In rejecting a similar agreement only because of the lack of a

judicial imprimatur on the arrangement, the Supreme Court of Nebraska stated: "We do
not want to do anything to discourage the use of the polygraph as it is a useful tcol in

police and prosecutorial work and no doubt results in many determinations not to prosecute." State v. Sanchell, 191 Neb. 505, 510, 216 N.W.2d 504, 508 (1974). The prevalence
of the lie detector in these arrangements is further illustrated by Workman v. Common-

wealth, 580 S.W.2d 206 (Ky. 1979), and Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 1280 (1971).
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psychologically deteriorate while awaiting trial, making his conviction more likely without respect to actual guilt.
It is true that a privilege regarding admissions will at times
operate to the detriment of unrelated cases. In most cases, however, the system will have benefited from the use of lie detection
in a more serious criminal dispute than the one from which the
privilege withholds evidence. This proposition derives from the
likelihood that the subject will more readily make admissions
that are less serious than the relevant question put by the examiner. Moreover, with regard to both the relevant question and the
crime of the unrelated admission, there will be an investigatory
gain of information without harming otherwise available evidence
of an unrelated offense. Indeed, although the admission made
may not be available for prosecution concerning the unrelated
offense, the examination will facilitate the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the unrelated crime. Pending charges may be
dropped against one person when another has admitted to the
unrelated crime. Finally, to the extent one views the examination
as a way to obtain confessions and unrelated admissions rather
than as an accurate truth-finding device, 6 ' investigators can simply obtain waivers from their subjects and proceed much like any
6 4 warnings to a suspect
police officer does after giving Miranda'
about to be interrogated. The accuracy of the results may be
lowered, but the investigatory function of the exam would be
preserved. More importantly, an accurate device to screen subjects and witnesses would still be available.
Given the above considerations, it would be appropriate for
courts to hold that, in general, unrelated admissions made to the
lie detector examiner in the course of a lie detector examination
would be protected by a privilege against disclosure, waivable by
the subject. There are, however, some situations in which the
operation of such a privilege would be unwise, and these must be
considered to determine whether, even with a privilege, the keeping of confidentiality will harm the courts' functioning.
D. Limitations on a Lie Detector Privilege
The purpose of a lie detector privilege is to protect the value
of lie detector examinations to the criminal justice process. If
163. See Axelrod, supra note 1, at 132-33 and cases cited in note 23 supra.
164. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

81

550

South
Carolina
Law Review,
Vol.REviEw
31, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 9[Vol. 31
SOUTH
CAROLINA
LAW

there is no intention to admit the results of the examination into
evidence, the shielding of lie detector information from the opposing party in a criminal case is appropriate. The admission of the
results changes this conclusion, however, because of the powerful
impact the results may have on the outcome of a case and the
corresponding need to allow for adequate direct and crossexamination. Since most courts have refused to admit the results
of defendants' examinations into evidence, 6 ' this problem does
not currently arise. A number of problems in the operation of a
privilege would accompany a change in the current law, although
they exist at least potentially in those jurisdictions in which the
defendant can attempt to lay the foundation 6 ' for the lie detector
operator as an expert witness.
The relationship between unrelated admissions and the validity of the lie detector results was discussed supra.'"7 The -trier
of fact simply cannot assess the accuracy of the operator's conclusion without knowing the role of these admissions in the examination, nor can an expert hired for the court or the opposing party.
If admission of results requires disclosure of the protected information, a waiver is necessary. In the simplest case, the defendant
will seek admission of the results. He is free to waive his privilege.
Courts might decide to limit the nature of the waiver to its specific purpose. For example, a defendant charged with robbery
might waive the privilege. He might have admitted to an unrelated shoplifting in the course of his examination. Should his
waiver be construed to preclude the use of his shoplifting admission for an unrelated prosecution? This problem could be resolved
as part of a stipulation between the parties. Since virtually all
current admissions of results are pursuant to stipulation, it is a
simple matter for the parties in a criminal case to address both
this matter and admissibility. Should the parties disagree on this
issue, the decision of the court to allow a limited waiver affects
the willingness to proffer results. This kind of limited waiver has
165. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
166." The willingness of many courts to allow an attempt at an adequate foundation,
e.g., United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008 (1975);
United States v. Infelice, 506 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975);
United States v. DeBetham, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 907
(1973); United States v. Wainwright, 413 F.2d 796 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1009 (1970), has only rarely led to an actual admission without stipulation. See Masri v.
United States, 434 U.S. 907 (1977) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
167. See notes 8-14 and accompanying text supra.
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been widely applied to statements made in the course of psychiatric examinations.1 8 For the same reason that the privilege
represents an appropriate assessment of the criminal justice
system's use for lie detectors, limited waivers should be allowed.
They are only crucial, however, to extend the common use of lie
detectors from an investigatory to an evidentiary role.
If the subject is not the defendant, more problems attend the
use of results for evidence. The defendant may be eager to place
favorable results before the court because his freedom depends on
it, whether or not he is allowed a limited waiver. Other witnesses
are in no such position. They stand to gain nothing directly if the
results of their examination are used on behalf of the defense or
the prosecution. The fear of punishment for their unrelated admissions may be a strong motivation. That fear can be mitigated
by the prosecutor. He can offer testimonial immunity. In other
words, he can assure the witness that statements made in the
course of the lie detector examination will not and cannot be used
to prosecute the witness. Any prosecution witness who volunteered to take the exam probably seeks, for a variety of reasons,
to help the prosecutor. This offer of immunity will thus frequently
give rise to a waiver. The prosecutor may also be willing to make
such offers to defense witnesses who have taken the examination
if prior arrangement has been made to admit the results. A prosecutor anxious to test defense witnesses and willing to stipulate to
the admissibility .of the results is also likely to take those steps
that give rise to the waiver essential to the admission of the results.
When the prosecution opposes the introduction of the results
and a limited waiver is not allowed by courts, witnesses, and in
some cases defendants, may be unwilling to consent to disclosure
of their unrelated admissions. The present loss of the evidentiary
role of lie detection, absent stipulation, is not a great one, since
presently none exists. The value of lie detector examinations has
been in their investigative role. The proposed privilege would
preserve that role. As courts increase their experience with stipulated results, a meaningful evaluation of a broader evidentiary
role of lie detectors can be made.
168. Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978); see 18 U.S.C. § 4244 (1976).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1980

83

REVIEW
LAW Vol.
South
Carolina
Law Review,
31, Iss. 3 [1980], Art.[Vol.
9
CAROLINA
SOUTH
31

E. The Absence of a Privilege
The alternatives to a privilege are inadequate. The subject's
expectation of confidentiality is not constitutionally protected. 69
If courts wish to allow some protection for lie detectors short of
recognizing a new privilege, they might extend precedent for lie
detector information in the work-product area. Recognition of lie
detectors as important investigatory devices that usually do not
yield, absent stipulation, admissible evidence that is crucial to
the case, may lead courts to regularly exclude lie detector information as work product. A more extreme view is to consider protected all of the defense investigation that the defendant does not
intend to present as evidence; thus, the defendant is not deterred
from a constitutionally adequate preparation for his case. The
problem with the first approach is that it is not sufficiently predictable. The second approach suffers because it is too expansive.
Because of the trend toward greater disclosure in criminal discovery, courts are unlikely to completely shut out so much information. The latter approach also leaves inadequate protection for
prosecution witnesses who take the examination.
The proposed privilege for statements made during a lie detector examination should be recognized or created by the judiciary because lie detectors are useful to the criminal justice system and are precariously used without a privilege. The ordinary
hostility of courts to the evidentiary loss that most privileges
entail is inappropriate to a lie detector privilege because the
criminal justice system will benefit appreciably by use of lie detectors to better resolve criminal charges. A privilege need not
be seen as an obligation to use lie detectors, since only willing
169. One seemingly attractive possibility is that the intimacy or confidentiality between the subject and operator reaches such a point that it is constitutionally protected
as privacy under Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). That argument, when
applied to the more complete, long term trust inherent in psychotherapy, Slovenko,
Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYE: L. RE V.175 (1960), has

met with an uneven welcome, In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr.

829 (1970); Note, Psychotherapy and Griswold: Is Confidence a Privilege or a Right, 3
CONN. L. REv. 599 (1971), and is unlikely to extend to a short relationship without traditional precedent or widespread practice. See note 104 and accompanying text supra.

The fact that lie detection, unlike psychiatry, is not the sole practical avenue to

present a particular kind of defense means a person is unlikely to face a Hobson's choice
of taking the test or waiving a constitutional right to a defense. Consequently, the entreaty

by the operator to reveal embarrassing or incriminating information may not be unconsti-

tutionally unfair. See Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1978); Collins v. Auger,

428 F. Supp. 1079 (S.D. Iowa 1977).
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subjects can be accurately tested. A privilege nonetheless would
allow those attorneys and policemen who now use the test to
continue to do so with maximal accuracy.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The lie detector examination is, at present, a useful investigatory device that aids the criminal justice system in its resolution of disputes. Unfortunately, a byproduct of the lie detector
technique is the frequency of admissions to unrelated crimes by
the subject. To maintain the accuracy of the device and its strategic attractiveness, the confidentiality of these admissions must
be protected. Otherwise, the examinations will become less accurate and ultimately will become largely a means of obtaining
material to impeach the subject's credibility. It will then serve no
large or useful role, given the prerequisite that the subject of the
examination be willing.
Meaningful protection of confidentiality is not available
through the usual criminal-law doctrines of discovery, work product, attorney-client privilege, and fifth amendment bar against
self-incrimination. An evidentiary privilege is needed to allow
both the defense and the prosecution to use lie detectors. In contrast to these other doctrines, a specific privilege will settle the
policy question of the usefulness of lie detectors. Since the evidentiary costs of the privilege proposed will generally be smaller than
the benefits conferred by the use of accurate lie detection, the
privilege should be created. The evidence excluded will usually
regard a less serious matter than the crime under investigation.
If lie detection leaves the realm of investigation and creates
admissible evidence in the form of an expert's opinion of the
truthfulness of a witness, the privilege must be waived as a condition of admissibility. The role of courts as resolvers of disputes is
not furthered when highly persuasive evidence is received without
meaningful cross-examination. For the results of the lie detector,
such cross-examination includes the otherwise privileged information. Absent the admission of results, however, the privilege
is a proper way to protect the useful role lie detectors presently
play in the criminal justice system.
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